Claude Pascal MCP Server
claude-pascal-mcp
PyPI
v0.13.6
Published by tina4stack — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Pascal/Delphi/Lazarus compilation and execution with Claude
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/pascal_mcp/adb.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/pascal_mcp/adb.py:118`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: xtend(args) return subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=not binary, timeo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/pascal_mcp/adb.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/pascal_mcp/compiler.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/pascal_mcp/compiler.py:74`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( [fpc_path, "-iV"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/pascal_mcp/compiler.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/pascal_mcp/installer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/pascal_mcp/installer.py:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( [fpc_exe, "-iV"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/pascal_mcp/installer.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/pascal_mcp/mac_ssh.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/pascal_mcp/mac_ssh.py:197`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( args, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, e
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/pascal_mcp/mac_ssh.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/pascal_mcp/paclient.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/pascal_mcp/paclient.py:98`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ient, *args] return subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, encoding="
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/pascal_mcp/paclient.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/pascal_mcp/preview_bridge.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/pascal_mcp/preview_bridge.py:109`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.Popen( [exe_path], stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/pascal_mcp/preview_bridge.py
Tools 53
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
setup_fpcingests untrusted inputadb_device_infono sensitive capabilityadb_devicesno sensitive capabilityadb_installno sensitive capabilityadb_keyno sensitive capabilityadb_launch_appno sensitive capabilityadb_list_packagesno sensitive capabilityadb_pullno sensitive capabilityadb_pushno sensitive capabilityadb_screenshotno sensitive capability
Show 43 more tools ↓
adb_stop_appno sensitive capabilityadb_swipeno sensitive capabilityadb_tapno sensitive capabilityadb_type_textno sensitive capabilityapp_clickno sensitive capabilityapp_keyno sensitive capabilityapp_typeno sensitive capabilitybuild_dprojno sensitive capabilitycheck_ios_deployno sensitive capabilitycheck_syntaxno sensitive capabilitycompile_delphi_projectno sensitive capabilitycompile_pascalno sensitive capabilityfocus_ideno sensitive capabilityget_compiler_infono sensitive capabilityios_codesignno sensitive capabilityios_create_ipano sensitive capabilityios_install_ipano sensitive capabilitylaunch_appno sensitive capabilitylist_app_windowsno sensitive capabilitylist_project_filesno sensitive capabilitylist_remote_profilesno sensitive capabilitymac_ssh_checkno sensitive capabilitymac_ssh_runno sensitive capabilityobserve_ideno sensitive capabilityparse_formno sensitive capabilitypaserver_check_connectionno sensitive capabilitypaserver_getno sensitive capabilitypaserver_infono sensitive capabilitypaserver_putno sensitive capabilitypaserver_removeno sensitive capabilitypaserver_scratch_dirno sensitive capabilityread_ide_errorsno sensitive capabilityrun_pascalno sensitive capabilityscreenshot_appno sensitive capabilitysim_bootno sensitive capabilitysim_installno sensitive capabilitysim_launchno sensitive capabilitysim_listno sensitive capabilitysim_open_urlno sensitive capabilitysim_screenshotno sensitive capabilitysim_shutdownno sensitive capabilitysim_terminateno sensitive capabilitysim_uninstallno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (53 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.13.6 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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