Claude Mcp Context MCP Server

claude-mcp-context npm v3.1.0

Published by nyrilol — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

Blazing-fast semantic code toolkit for Claude - Smart context, git-aware indexing, symbol editing, find references. 15+ languages, NO LSP needed, 100% free

Trust grade
A
92/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 92/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 99 − adoption risk = 92/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−1.2 Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 supply-chain

2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 3

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/git-utils.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/git-utils.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); export clas

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/git-utils.js

low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (install.cjs)MTC-SRC-002

In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`install.cjs:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: spawnSync } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); const fs = require('fs'); const ROOT = __dirname

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server install.cjs

low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010

"claude-mcp-context" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.

Evidence: node install.cjs || exit 0

Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.

Location: package claude-mcp-context

Tools 21

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • build_dependency_graphno sensitive capability
  • clear_cacheno sensitive capability
  • delete_symbolno sensitive capability
  • find_similarno sensitive capability
  • find_symbolno sensitive capability
  • find_symbol_referencesno sensitive capability
  • get_classno sensitive capability
  • get_dependenciesno sensitive capability
  • get_dependency_treeno sensitive capability
  • get_file_summaryno sensitive capability
Show 11 more tools ↓
  • get_functionno sensitive capability
  • get_function_with_contextno sensitive capability
  • get_related_symbolsno sensitive capability
  • get_relevant_contextno sensitive capability
  • get_repository_structureno sensitive capability
  • get_usage_statsno sensitive capability
  • index_git_changesno sensitive capability
  • index_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • insert_after_symbolno sensitive capability
  • replace_symbolno sensitive capability
  • search_codeno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v3.1.0 latest A 92/100 3 1.13.0 2026-09-07

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 92/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan claude-mcp-context --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

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