claude-mcp-context
npm
v3.1.0
Published by nyrilol — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Blazing-fast semantic code toolkit for Claude - Smart context, git-aware indexing, symbol editing, find references. 15+ languages, NO LSP needed, 100% free
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/git-utils.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); export clas
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/git-utils.js
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`install.cjs:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); const fs = require('fs'); const ROOT = __dirname
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server install.cjs
"claude-mcp-context" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node install.cjs || exit 0
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package claude-mcp-context
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
build_dependency_graphno sensitive capabilityclear_cacheno sensitive capabilitydelete_symbolno sensitive capabilityfind_similarno sensitive capabilityfind_symbolno sensitive capabilityfind_symbol_referencesno sensitive capabilityget_classno sensitive capabilityget_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityget_dependency_treeno sensitive capabilityget_file_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_functionno sensitive capabilityget_function_with_contextno sensitive capabilityget_related_symbolsno sensitive capabilityget_relevant_contextno sensitive capabilityget_repository_structureno sensitive capabilityget_usage_statsno sensitive capabilityindex_git_changesno sensitive capabilityindex_repositoryno sensitive capabilityinsert_after_symbolno sensitive capabilityreplace_symbolno sensitive capabilitysearch_codeno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.1.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan claude-mcp-context --online
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