Claude Flow — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.5.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"target": {
"id": "claude-flow",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "claude-flow"
},
"server": {
"name": "claude-flow"
}
},
"grade": "F",
"score": {
"score": 52,
"grade": "F",
"band": "F",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 47.95,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 7.7
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-011",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/neural.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/neural.js:4018`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/neural.js"
},
"evidence": "eval (",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/neural.js",
"line": 4018
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/services/distill-oracle.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/services/distill-oracle.js:19`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/services/distill-oracle.js"
},
"evidence": "eval (",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/services/distill-oracle.js",
"line": 19
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-011",
"title": "Assembled command execution and dynamic evaluation in the same server",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "The implementation builds shell commands out of runtime values AND evaluates runtime values as code. Each is a separate arbitrary-execution primitive; a server exposing both gives anything that reaches either one a direct path to running attacker-chosen code.",
"remediation": "Remove the dynamic eval, and pass command arguments as an argv array instead of building a shell string. If both are genuinely required, constrain and validate every value that can reach them.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "implementation"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rules": [
"MTC-SRC-009",
"MTC-SRC-010"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/analyze.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/analyze.js:287`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/analyze.js"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/analyze.js",
"line": 287
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/neural.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/neural.js:1445`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/neural.js"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/neural.js",
"line": 1445
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/security.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/security.js:144`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/security.js"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/security.js",
"line": 144
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/services/distill-oracle.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/services/distill-oracle.js:19`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/services/distill-oracle.js"
},
"evidence": "eval (",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/services/distill-oracle.js",
"line": 19
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (v3/@claude-flow/guidance/dist/analyzer.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/guidance/dist/analyzer.js:2104`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/guidance/dist/analyzer.js"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/guidance/dist/analyzer.js",
"line": 2104
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (.claude-plugin/scripts/ruflo-hook.cjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.claude-plugin/scripts/ruflo-hook.cjs:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".claude-plugin/scripts/ruflo-hook.cjs"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": ".claude-plugin/scripts/ruflo-hook.cjs",
"line": 7
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (.claude/helpers/github-safe.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.claude/helpers/github-safe.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".claude/helpers/github-safe.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": ".claude/helpers/github-safe.js",
"line": 22
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (.claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:82`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": ".claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs",
"line": 82
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".claude/helpers/statusline.cjs"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": ".claude/helpers/statusline.cjs",
"line": 25
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/appliance/rvfa-builder.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/appliance/rvfa-builder.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/appliance/rvfa-builder.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/appliance/rvfa-builder.js",
"line": 10
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/appliance/rvfa-runner.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/appliance/rvfa-runner.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/appliance/rvfa-runner.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/appliance/rvfa-runner.js",
"line": 11
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-agent.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-agent.js:44`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-agent.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-agent.js",
"line": 44
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-critic.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-critic.js:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-critic.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-critic.js",
"line": 35
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-decomposer.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-decomposer.js:36`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-decomposer.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-decomposer.js",
"line": 36
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-judge.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-judge.js:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-judge.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-judge.js",
"line": 30
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/doctor.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/doctor.js:1350`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/doctor.js"
},
"evidence": "fetch(`http://${bind}/status`",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/doctor.js",
"line": 1350
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/neural.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/neural.js:1153`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/neural.js"
},
"evidence": "fetch('https://api.pinata.cloud/pinning/pinJSONToIPFS'",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/neural.js",
"line": 1153
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/mcp-tools/agent-execute-core.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/mcp-tools/agent-execute-core.js:111`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/mcp-tools/agent-execute-core.js"
},
"evidence": "fetch('https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages'",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/mcp-tools/agent-execute-core.js",
"line": 111
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/update/checker.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/update/checker.js:35`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/update/checker.js"
},
"evidence": "fetch(`https://registry.npmjs.org/${encodeURIComponent(packageName)}`",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/update/checker.js",
"line": 35
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/doctor.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/doctor.js:690`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/doctor.js"
},
"evidence": "exec(`SELECT count(*) FROM memory_entries m WHERE EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM ${",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/doctor.js",
"line": 690
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/services/distill-tuning.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/services/distill-tuning.js:397`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/services/distill-tuning.js"
},
"evidence": "exec(`DELETE FROM ${",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/services/distill-tuning.js",
"line": 397
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (.claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:126`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs"
},
"evidence": "require(modulePath)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": ".claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs",
"line": 126
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/appliance/ruvllm-bridge.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/appliance/ruvllm-bridge.js:249`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/appliance/ruvllm-bridge.js"
},
"evidence": "import(pkg)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/appliance/ruvllm-bridge.js",
"line": 249
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-hardness/predictor.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-hardness/predictor.js:237`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-hardness/predictor.js"
},
"evidence": "import(state)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-hardness/predictor.js",
"line": 237
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-hardness/predictor.smoke.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-hardness/predictor.smoke.js:185`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-hardness/predictor.smoke.js"
},
"evidence": "import(exported)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/benchmarks/gaia-hardness/predictor.smoke.js",
"line": 185
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/appliance.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/appliance.js:27`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/appliance.js"
},
"evidence": "import(path)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/appliance.js",
"line": 27
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/doctor.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/doctor.js:893`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/doctor.js"
},
"evidence": "import(specifier)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/doctor.js",
"line": 893
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/init.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/init.js:52`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/init.js"
},
"evidence": "import(codexModuleId)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/init.js",
"line": 52
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/memory-distill.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/memory-distill.js:229`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/memory-distill.js"
},
"evidence": "import(mod)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/memory-distill.js",
"line": 229
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/neural.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/neural.js:1524`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/neural.js"
},
"evidence": "import(attentionPkg)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/neural.js",
"line": 1524
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/route.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/route.js:516`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/route.js"
},
"evidence": "import(data)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/route.js",
"line": 516
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "17ee66287317d1c79c9de01ae25da5f11550fe3aa83f1ab9f239d1137187aad4",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 18,
"medium": 16,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}