Claude Code Telegrammer MCP Server
claude-code-telegrammer
PyPI
v0.6.0
Published by ywatanabe1989 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Custom Telegram MCP server + TUI auto-responder for running Claude Code as an autonomous Telegram agent
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Shell/command execution in server code (.claude/skills/skill-creator/eval-viewer/generate_review.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`.claude/skills/skill-creator/eval-viewer/generate_review.py:291`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["lsof", "-ti", f":{port}"], capture_output=True, text=T
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .claude/skills/skill-creator/eval-viewer/generate_review.py
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (docs/to_claude/examples/example-python-project-scitex/scripts/mnist/clf_svm.py)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`docs/to_claude/examples/example-python-project-scitex/scripts/mnist/clf_svm.py:73`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: scitex.io.save(model, eval(CONFIG.PATH.MNIST.MODEL_SVM)) return 0 def parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace: pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server docs/to_claude/examples/example-python-project-scitex/scripts/mnist/clf_svm.py
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (docs/to_claude/examples/example-python-project-scitex/scripts/mnist/download.py)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`docs/to_claude/examples/example-python-project-scitex/scripts/mnist/download.py:41`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: malize( eval(CONFIG.MNIST.NORMALIZE.MEAN), eval(CONFIG.MNIST.NORMALIZE.STD),
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server docs/to_claude/examples/example-python-project-scitex/scripts/mnist/download.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (.claude/skills/pptx/scripts/office/soffice.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`.claude/skills/pptx/scripts/office/soffice.py:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: = get_soffice_env() subprocess.run(["soffice", ...], env=env) """ import os import socket import subprocess import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .claude/skills/pptx/scripts/office/soffice.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (.claude/skills/pptx/scripts/office/validators/redlining.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`.claude/skills/pptx/scripts/office/validators/redlining.py:138`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run( [ "git", "di
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .claude/skills/pptx/scripts/office/validators/redlining.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (.claude/skills/pptx/scripts/thumbnail.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`.claude/skills/pptx/scripts/thumbnail.py:161`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: tem}.pdf" result = subprocess.run( [ "soffice", "--headless", "--conver
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .claude/skills/pptx/scripts/thumbnail.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (.claude/skills/skill-creator/scripts/improve_description.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`.claude/skills/skill-creator/scripts/improve_description.py:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: UDECODE"} result = subprocess.run( cmd, input=prompt, capture_output=True, text=Tru
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .claude/skills/skill-creator/scripts/improve_description.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (.claude/skills/skill-creator/scripts/run_eval.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`.claude/skills/skill-creator/scripts/run_eval.py:85`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: DE"} process = subprocess.Popen( cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subpro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .claude/skills/skill-creator/scripts/run_eval.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (.claude/skills/webapp-testing/scripts/with_server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`.claude/skills/webapp-testing/scripts/with_server.py:69`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: & process = subprocess.Popen( server['cmd'], shell=True, std
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .claude/skills/webapp-testing/scripts/with_server.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (.claude/skills/xlsx/scripts/office/soffice.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`.claude/skills/xlsx/scripts/office/soffice.py:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: = get_soffice_env() subprocess.run(["soffice", ...], env=env) """ import os import socket import subprocess import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .claude/skills/xlsx/scripts/office/soffice.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (.claude/skills/xlsx/scripts/office/validators/redlining.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`.claude/skills/xlsx/scripts/office/validators/redlining.py:138`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run( [ "git", "di
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .claude/skills/xlsx/scripts/office/validators/redlining.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (.claude/skills/xlsx/scripts/recalc.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`.claude/skills/xlsx/scripts/recalc.py:34`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: out(): try: subprocess.run( ["gtimeout", "--version"], capture_output=True, timeout=1, check=Fal
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .claude/skills/xlsx/scripts/recalc.py
Tools 11
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_attachmentingests untrusted inputedit_messageno sensitive capabilityget_contextno sensitive capabilityget_historyno sensitive capabilityget_unreadno sensitive capabilityhealthno sensitive capabilitymark_readno sensitive capabilityreactno sensitive capabilityreplyno sensitive capabilitysearch_messagesno sensitive capability
Show 1 more tool ↓
send_documentno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (11 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.6.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.5.12 |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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