Claude Code Tailscale MCP Server
claude-code-tailscale
npm
v0.2.0
Source verified
Published by rosskukulinski — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tshelper.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tshelper.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { once } from "node:events"; import { createInterface } from "node:readli
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tshelper.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([tailscale_fetch, tailscale_connect_test, tailscale_check_messages]) co-exist with external-action tools ([tailscale_send_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [tailscale_fetch, tailscale_connect_test, tailscale_check_messages] → sinks [tailscale_send_message]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow tailscale_fetch → tailscale_send_message
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"claude-code-tailscale" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.mjs
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package claude-code-tailscale
Tools 20
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
tailscale_check_messagesingests untrusted inputtailscale_connect_testingests untrusted inputtailscale_fetchingests untrusted inputtailscale_send_messagenetwork egresstailscale_acl_checkno sensitive capabilitytailscale_agentsno sensitive capabilitytailscale_certno sensitive capabilitytailscale_devicesno sensitive capabilitytailscale_dns_lookupno sensitive capabilitytailscale_netcheckno sensitive capability
Show 10 more tools ↓
tailscale_pingno sensitive capabilitytailscale_port_forwardno sensitive capabilitytailscale_statusno sensitive capabilitytailscale_task_createno sensitive capabilitytailscale_task_listno sensitive capabilitytailscale_task_updateno sensitive capabilitytailscale_team_createno sensitive capabilitytailscale_team_infono sensitive capabilitytailscale_team_joinno sensitive capabilitytailscale_whoisno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (20 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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