Claude Code Conversation Search MCP Server
claude-code-conversation-search-mcp
npm
v1.2.1
Published by tonysimonovsky — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Never lose your Claude Code conversations again. Search across all projects, find old chats, and resume where you left off.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/utils/shortcuts.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/utils/shortcuts.js:90`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn } = await import('child_process'); const mklink = spawn('cmd', ['/c', 'mklink', '/J', `"${linkPath}"`, `"$
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/utils/shortcuts.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/utils/shortcuts.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/utils/shortcuts.ts:109`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn } = await import('child_process'); const mklink = spawn('cmd', ['/c', 'mklink', '/J', `"${linkPath}"`, `"${tar
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/utils/shortcuts.ts
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"claude-code-conversation-search-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: echo 'Thanks for installing claude-code-conversation-search-mcp! See examples/ for usage.'
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package claude-code-conversation-search-mcp
Tools 9
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
claude-code-conversation-search-mcpno sensitive capabilityget_config_infono sensitive capabilityget_conversation_messagesno sensitive capabilityget_message_contextno sensitive capabilityget_server_infono sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_toolsno sensitive capabilityrefresh_indexno sensitive capabilitysearch_conversationsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (9 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan claude-code-conversation-search-mcp --onlineMore in Web, Search & Scraping
Agent IP: MCP server with patents search tools
MCP server for searching the Agent Almanac — the public catalog of 9,000+ Model Context Protocol servers. Find, install, and discover MCP servers from inside Claude Desktop, Cursor, Continue, Zed, or any MCP-aware agent.
Search agents & MCP servers by capability, with daily-observed pricing, liveness and market data.
Verified merchants accepting agentic payments on Lightning/L402/BOLT12/USDT — search, verify, pay.
Airframe MCP Client - Connect agents to Airframe's product intelligence
Amazon product search demand over time, with growth for any keyword. Free key at trendsmcp.ai