Claude Chrome Parallel MCP Server
claude-chrome-parallel
npm
v1.0.1
Published by shaun0927 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chrome/launcher.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chrome/launcher.js:41`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: etChromeLauncher; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const path = __importStar(require("path")); const fs
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chrome/launcher.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/claude-session.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/claude-session.js:49`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: r(require("os")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const BASE_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), '.claude-ch
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/claude-session.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/index.js:56`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: r(require("os")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const update_check_1 = require("./update-check"); co
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/uninstall.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/uninstall.js:43`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: r(require("os")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); /** * Get the installation directory */ function g
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/uninstall.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lightpanda/launcher.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lightpanda/launcher.js:40`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: auncher = void 0; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const puppeteer = __importStar(require("puppeteer-co
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lightpanda/launcher.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/cli/install.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/cli/install.js:44`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: r(require("os")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); /** * Get the installation directory */ function g
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/install.js
Tools 47
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
batch_executeno sensitive capabilityccp_stopno sensitive capabilityclick_elementno sensitive capabilitycomputerno sensitive capabilityconsole_captureno sensitive capabilitycookiesno sensitive capabilitydrag_dropno sensitive capabilityemulate_deviceno sensitive capabilityexecute_planno sensitive capabilityfile_uploadno sensitive capability
Show 37 more tools ↓
fill_formno sensitive capabilityfindno sensitive capabilityform_inputno sensitive capabilitygeolocationno sensitive capabilityhttp_authno sensitive capabilityjavascript_toolno sensitive capabilitylightweight_scrollno sensitive capabilitymemory_queryno sensitive capabilitymemory_recordno sensitive capabilitymemory_validateno sensitive capabilitynavigateno sensitive capabilitynetworkno sensitive capabilitypage_contentno sensitive capabilitypage_pdfno sensitive capabilitypage_reloadno sensitive capabilityperformance_metricsno sensitive capabilityread_pageno sensitive capabilityrequest_interceptno sensitive capabilityselector_queryno sensitive capabilitystorageno sensitive capabilitytabs_closeno sensitive capabilitytabs_context_mcpno sensitive capabilitytabs_create_mcpno sensitive capabilityuser_agentno sensitive capabilitywait_and_clickno sensitive capabilitywait_forno sensitive capabilityworker_completeno sensitive capabilityworker_createno sensitive capabilityworker_deleteno sensitive capabilityworker_listno sensitive capabilityworker_updateno sensitive capabilityworkflow_cleanupno sensitive capabilityworkflow_collectno sensitive capabilityworkflow_collect_partialno sensitive capabilityworkflow_initno sensitive capabilityworkflow_statusno sensitive capabilityxpath_queryno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (47 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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