Classroom Suite MCP Server
classroom-suite-mcp
PyPI
v1.0.0
Published by your_username — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Unified MCP server for Google Classroom, Drive, and Docs - seamlessly integrate education tools with AI assistants
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Unsafe deserialization MTC-SRC-007 | permissions |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: download_file → list_files → upload_file. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow download_file → list_files → upload_file
medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_file
medium Unsafe deserialization (src/classroom_suite_mcp/auth.py)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`src/classroom_suite_mcp/auth.py:78`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: creds = pickle.load(token) else: creds = Credentials.from_authorized_user_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/classroom_suite_mcp/auth.py
low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_file
Tools 17
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
delete_filewrites filesdownload_fileingests untrusted inputlist_filesreads sensitive dataupload_filenetwork egresscreate_docno sensitive capabilitycreate_folderno sensitive capabilityexport_pdfno sensitive capabilityget_assignmentno sensitive capabilityget_courseno sensitive capabilitylist_assignmentsno sensitive capability
Show 7 more tools ↓
list_coursesno sensitive capabilitylist_submissionsno sensitive capabilityread_docno sensitive capabilitysearch_filesno sensitive capabilityshare_fileno sensitive capabilitysubmit_assignmentno sensitive capabilityupdate_docno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
B 87/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan classroom-suite-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Files & Storage
Safe bulk Meta ads: launch 150+ campaigns from Drive folders with spend guardrails and validation.
CLI tool to add MCP servers to various AI coding clients
MCP compatibility adapter for Agent Tool Protocol
MCP server for multi-tenant DuckDB management with R2/S3 storage
A stdio-to-HTTP MCP proxy that transparently intercepts file parameters, reading local files and base64-encoding them before forwarding to the remote server.
Free buyer-side outcome verification and provider comparison for supplied agent receipts.