Clash Control — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "clash-control-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "clash-control-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "clash-control-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 83,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (66 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/health-check.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/health-check.js:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/health-check.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { connect } from 'node:net'; import { platform } from 'node:os'; import *",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/health-check.js",
"line": 29,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/optimizer/baseline.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/optimizer/baseline.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/optimizer/baseline.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { platform } from 'node:os'; import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'; im",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/optimizer/baseline.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/system-verifiers.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/system-verifiers.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/system-verifiers.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { platform } from 'node:os'; import { createConnection } from 'node:net';",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/system-verifiers.js",
"line": 14,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/doctor.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/doctor.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/doctor.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'node:fs'; import { redactValue } from '../redaction.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/doctor.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/verge-detector.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/verge-detector.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/verge-detector.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve } from 'node:path'; import",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/verge-detector.js",
"line": 16,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/verge-detector.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/verge-detector.js:76`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/verge-detector.js"
},
"evidence": "{ appVersion = execSync(`defaults read \"${join(macAppPath, 'Contents/Info.plist')}\" CFBundleShortVersionString`",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/verge-detector.js",
"line": 76,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/adapter-app-transaction.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/adapter-app-transaction.mjs:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/adapter-app-transaction.mjs"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { constants as fsConstants } from 'node:fs'; import { isIP } from 'node:n",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/adapter-app-transaction.mjs",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/adapter-cli.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/adapter-cli.mjs:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/adapter-cli.mjs"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { dirname, join } from 'node:path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:u",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/adapter-cli.mjs",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/adapter-install-lib.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/adapter-install-lib.mjs:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/adapter-install-lib.mjs"
},
"evidence": "ile, spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import { inspectAdapterApp, stageA",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/adapter-install-lib.mjs",
"line": 26,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/adapter-patch-lib.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/adapter-patch-lib.mjs:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/adapter-patch-lib.mjs"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { dirname, join, relative, resolve, sep } from 'node:path'; import { ha",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/adapter-patch-lib.mjs",
"line": 12,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/install-adapter-patch.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/install-adapter-patch.mjs:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/install-adapter-patch.mjs"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { rm } from 'node:fs/promises'; import { dirname, join } from 'node:path'",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/install-adapter-patch.mjs",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "clash.capabilities",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_env\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "clash.doctor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.verge.detect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.verge.get_settings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.verge.get_directories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.verge.get_active_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.profiles.list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.profiles.inspect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.config.get_effective",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.config.get_generated",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.config.get_persistent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.config.audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.runtime.get_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.runtime.list_proxy_groups",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.runtime.get_proxy_group",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.runtime.test_proxy_delay",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.runtime.select_proxy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.runtime.list_proxy_providers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.runtime.list_rule_providers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.runtime.list_connections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.runtime.refresh_proxy_provider",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.runtime.refresh_rule_provider",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.runtime.close_connection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.config.create_workspace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.config.preview_change",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.config.validate_change",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.config.apply_transaction",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.config.rollback",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.transaction.resume",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.recovery.status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.verge.set_unified_delay",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.verge.set_log_level",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.verge.set_ipv6",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.verge.configure_tun",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.verge.configure_dns_override",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.verge.configure_ports",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.verge.configure_lan_access",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.verge.set_auto_close_connection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.profiles.inspect_chain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.merge.inspect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.override.inspect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.rules.inspect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.profiles.refresh",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.profiles.activate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.profiles.update_metadata",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.merge.update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.override.update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.rules.add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.rules.remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.optimize.diagnose_network",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.optimize.dns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.optimize.rules",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.optimize.proxy_groups",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.optimize.health_checks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.optimize.openai",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.optimize.github",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_pr\""
],
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_private\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "clash.optimize.youtube",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.optimize.streaming",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.optimize.verify_baseline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.optimize.compare_probes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.optimize.execution_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.verge.preferences.inspect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.verge.preferences.set_basic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.verge.preferences.configure_theme",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.verge.preferences.configure_layout",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clash.verge.preferences.configure_hotkeys",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "4fddd2f19a02d9418ecd896b0844ec024ccec0e9c90f4b60d45b4ce2fb655a4a",
"stats": {
"tools": 66,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 5,
"medium": 1,
"low": 5,
"info": 0
}
}
}