Clarifyprompt MCP Server

clarifyprompt-mcp npm v1.15.0

Published by lumabyteco — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.

Trust grade
B
87/100
Last scanned
Trust
B · 87/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
B Why this grade 100 − 12.6 = 87/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−6.3 Unsafe deserialization MTC-SRC-007 permissions
−6.3 Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 injection

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 4

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/engine/context/gitSignals.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/engine/context/gitSignals.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/engine/context/gitSignals.js

medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/engine/search/client.js)MTC-SRC-003

In the server's implementation (`dist/engine/search/client.js:48`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: fetch('https://api.tavily.com/search'

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/engine/search/client.js

medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/engine/memory/store.js)MTC-SRC-009

In the server's implementation (`dist/engine/memory/store.js:26`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: exec(`CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ${this.vecTable} USING vec0( kind TEXT PARTITION KEY, source_id INTEGER, vec flo

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/engine/memory/store.js

medium Unsafe deserialization (dist/engine/config/platformLoader.js)MTC-SRC-007

In the server's implementation (`dist/engine/config/platformLoader.js:85`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: yaml.load(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/engine/config/platformLoader.js

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.15.0 latest B 87/100 4 1.5.0 2026-07-22

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MCP Trust Score: B · 87/100
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npx mcptrustchecker scan clarifyprompt-mcp --online

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