Cicada MCP Server
cicada-mcp
PyPI
v0.6.5
Published by wende — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Code Intelligence MCP for 15 languages
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Shell/command execution in server code (cicada/git/cochange_analyzer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cicada/git/cochange_analyzer.py:177`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=repo_path, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True) commi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cicada/git/cochange_analyzer.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cicada/git/helper.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cicada/git/helper.py:208`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ry result = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=str(self.repo_path), capture_output=True, text=True, ch
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cicada/git/helper.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cicada/github/finder.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cicada/github/finder.py:72`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: _ = subprocess.run( ["gh", "--version"], capture_output=True, check=True, cwd=self.r
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cicada/github/finder.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cicada/languages/python/indexer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cicada/languages/python/indexer.py:905`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=repo_path, capture_outp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cicada/languages/python/indexer.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cicada/languages/python/scip_installer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cicada/languages/python/scip_installer.py:117`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: input result = subprocess.run([scip_path, "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True) if result.retu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cicada/languages/python/scip_installer.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cicada/languages/rust/indexer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cicada/languages/rust/indexer.py:60`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( [ra_path, "--version"], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cicada/languages/rust/indexer.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cicada/languages/scip/configs.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cicada/languages/scip/configs.py:57`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( [dart_cmd, "pub", "get"], cwd=repo_path, cap
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cicada/languages/scip/configs.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cicada/languages/scip/indexer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cicada/languages/scip/indexer.py:342`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( command, cwd=repo_path, capture_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cicada/languages/scip/indexer.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cicada/languages/scip/installer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cicada/languages/scip/installer.py:85`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: True) result = subprocess.run( ["npm", "install", "--prefix", str(_LOCAL_NODE_DIR), config.package]
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cicada/languages/scip/installer.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cicada/mcp/handlers/git_handlers.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cicada/mcp/handlers/git_handlers.py:92`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run( ["git", "show", "-s", "--format=%ai", changed_since],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cicada/mcp/handlers/git_handlers.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (cicada/languages/__init__.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`cicada/languages/__init__.py:91`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .", 1) module = __import__(module_path, fromlist=[class_name]) return getattr(module, class_name) @
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cicada/languages/__init__.py
Tools 7
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
expand_resultno sensitive capabilitygit_historyno sensitive capabilityqueryno sensitive capabilityquery_jqno sensitive capabilityrefresh_indexno sensitive capabilitysearch_functionno sensitive capabilitysearch_moduleno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (7 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.6.5 latest |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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