Chromecp MCP Server
chromecp
npm
v1.1.1
Published by dddabtc — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Chrome MCP Server - Standalone version of mcp-chrome-bridge by hangye
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/record-replay/actions/handlers/extract.ts)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/record-replay/actions/handlers/extract.ts:93`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e const fn = new Function(code); const result = fn(); // Handle promises i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/record-replay/actions/handlers/extract.ts
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/record-replay/actions/handlers/script.ts)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/record-replay/actions/handlers/script.ts:118`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const fn = new Function(...argNames, wrappedCode); const result = fn(...argValues);
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/record-replay/actions/handlers/script.ts
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/tools/browser/inject-script.ts)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/tools/browser/inject-script.ts:201`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: func: (code) => new Function(code)(), args: [jsScript], world: ExecutionWorld.MAIN, }); }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/tools/browser/inject-script.ts
high Dynamic code execution in server code (chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/record-replay/actions/handlers/extract.ts)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/record-replay/actions/handlers/extract.ts:93`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e const fn = new Function(code); const result = fn(); // Handle promises i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/record-replay/actions/handlers/extract.ts
high Dynamic code execution in server code (chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/record-replay/actions/handlers/script.ts)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/record-replay/actions/handlers/script.ts:118`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const fn = new Function(...argNames, wrappedCode); const result = fn(...argValues);
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/record-replay/actions/handlers/script.ts
high Dynamic code execution in server code (chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/record-replay/nodes/conditional.ts)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/record-replay/nodes/conditional.ts:18`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const fn = new Function( 'vars', 'workflow', `try { return !!(${code
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/record-replay/nodes/conditional.ts
high Dynamic code execution in server code (chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/tools/browser/inject-script.ts)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/tools/browser/inject-script.ts:201`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: func: (code) => new Function(code)(), args: [jsScript], world: ExecutionWorld.MAIN, }); }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/tools/browser/inject-script.ts
high Dynamic code execution in server code (chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/tools/browser/userscript.ts)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/tools/browser/userscript.ts:108`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: row return !!new Function('return 1')(); } catch { return false; } },
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server chrome-extension/entrypoints/background/tools/browser/userscript.ts
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (chrome-extension/utils/simd-math-engine.ts)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`chrome-extension/utils/simd-math-engine.ts:50`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: onst wasmModule = await import(wasmUrl); const wasmInstance = await wasmModule.default(); this.wasmMod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server chrome-extension/utils/simd-math-engine.ts
Tools 3
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browser_clickno sensitive capabilitybrowser_navigateno sensitive capabilitybrowser_screenshotno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (3 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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