GitLab Workflow MCP Server
@chntif/mcp-gitlab-workflow
npm
v0.1.2
Published by @chntif — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Creates GitLab issues from requirements and submits merge requests from existing issues, plus atomic GitLab API tools for issue-driven development.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/local-delivery.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/local-delivery.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; export class LocalGitError extends Error { constructor(message) { su
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/local-delivery.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([workflow_review_mr_post_comment, workflow_sync_local_branch, gitlab_get_issue_images]) co-exist with external-action tools ([workflow_requirement_to_delivery, gitlab_create_issue, gitlab_add_issue_comment]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [workflow_review_mr_post_comment, workflow_sync_local_branch, gitlab_get_issue_images] → sinks [workflow_requirement_to_delivery, gitlab_create_issue,
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow workflow_review_mr_post_comment → workflow_requirement_to_delivery
Tools 28
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
gitlab_add_issue_commentnetwork egressgitlab_create_issuenetwork egressgitlab_get_issue_imagesingests untrusted inputworkflow_requirement_to_deliverynetwork egressworkflow_review_mr_post_commentingests untrusted inputworkflow_sync_local_branchingests untrusted inputgitlab_approve_mrno sensitive capabilitygitlab_commit_filesno sensitive capabilitygitlab_create_branchno sensitive capabilitygitlab_create_labelno sensitive capability
Show 18 more tools ↓
gitlab_create_merge_requestno sensitive capabilitygitlab_create_mr_noteno sensitive capabilitygitlab_delete_labelno sensitive capabilitygitlab_get_current_userno sensitive capabilitygitlab_get_fileno sensitive capabilitygitlab_get_issueno sensitive capabilitygitlab_get_issue_notesno sensitive capabilitygitlab_get_merge_requestno sensitive capabilitygitlab_get_mr_changesno sensitive capabilitygitlab_get_mr_notesno sensitive capabilitygitlab_list_labelsno sensitive capabilitygitlab_unapprove_mrno sensitive capabilitygitlab_update_labelno sensitive capabilitygitlab_upload_project_fileno sensitive capabilityworkflow_issue_log_appendno sensitive capabilityworkflow_issue_to_deliveryno sensitive capabilityworkflow_prepare_delivery_workspaceno sensitive capabilityworkflow_requirement_to_issueno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (28 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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