Slack — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@chinchillaenterprises/mcp-slack",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@chinchillaenterprises/mcp-slack"
},
"server": {
"name": "@chinchillaenterprises/mcp-slack"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (54 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/http.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/http.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/http.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { randomUUID } from \"node:crypto\"; import { StreamableHTTPServerTransport",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/http.js",
"line": 22,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "e, execFileSync } from \"child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"util\"; import { fileURLToPath } from \"url\"; import Fu",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 14,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([slack_get_channel_history, slack_pull_filtered, slack_download_file, slack_get_thread_replies]) co-exist with external-action tools ([slack_send_message, slack_forward_message, slack_bulk_forward_messages, slack_upload_file]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "slack_get_channel_history → slack_send_message"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [slack_get_channel_history, slack_pull_filtered, slack_download_file, slack_get_thread_replies] → sinks [slack_send_message, slack_forward_message, sl",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"slack_get_channel_history",
"slack_pull_filtered",
"slack_download_file",
"slack_get_thread_replies"
],
"sinks": [
"slack_send_message",
"slack_forward_message",
"slack_bulk_forward_messages",
"slack_upload_file"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"icon_url\" on \"slack_send_message\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"slack_send_message\" takes a URL/host parameter \"icon_url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "slack_send_message",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.icon_url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "icon_url"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"url\" on \"slack_download_file\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"slack_download_file\" takes a URL/host parameter \"url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "slack_download_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "url"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"slack_get_channel_history",
"slack_pull_filtered",
"slack_download_file",
"slack_get_thread_replies"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"slack_send_message",
"slack_forward_message",
"slack_bulk_forward_messages",
"slack_upload_file"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_active_account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_accounts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_list_channels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_send_message",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "slack_get_channel_history",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "slack_pull_filtered",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "slack_pull_since",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_mine_incidents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_digest",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_add_reaction",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_list_users",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_get_user_by_name",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_get_user_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_list_channel_members",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_list_external_users",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_search_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_download_file",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "slack_search_messages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_search_by_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_search_by_date_range",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_get_workspace_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_create_channel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_invite_users",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_remove_users",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_invite_external",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_archive_channel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_rename_channel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_set_channel_topic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_pin_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_unpin_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_delete_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_edit_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_schedule_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_get_user_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_get_user_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_create_reminder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_list_reminders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_get_custom_emoji",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_send_formatted_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_audit_user_activity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_bulk_react_messages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_forward_message",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"forward_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "slack_bulk_forward_messages",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"forward_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "slack_get_thread_replies",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "slack_upload_file",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"upload_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "slack_send_diagram",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_send_table",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_send_card",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_start_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_update_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_complete_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_poll",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_claim_lane",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_checkin",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "179a412a626f85cfc4a525b55d5e34b7f3d8861923837c572cad3deb9b27ffc3",
"stats": {
"tools": 54,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}