chemdraw-mcp
PyPI
v0.2.1
Published by jurimaxam-dotcom — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server that turns molecule names or SMILES into publication-style 2D structure drawings (PNG/SVG via RDKit) — reaction schemes, mechanisms, spectra. Unofficial, not affiliated with Revvity.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`chemdraw_tool/chemdraw.py:81`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: filepath) result = subprocess.run(["osascript", "-e", script], capture_output=True, text=True) if result.return
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server chemdraw_tool/chemdraw.py
In the server's implementation (`chemdraw_tool/resolver.py:102`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ok = ( subprocess.run( [java, "-version"], capture_output=True, timeout=10
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server chemdraw_tool/resolver.py
In the server's implementation (`chemdraw_tool/ui/src/utils/svgToPng.e2e.mjs:67`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const mod = await import(moduleUrl); // the real shipped module const blob = await mod.svgToPngBlob(svg, {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server chemdraw_tool/ui/src/utils/svgToPng.e2e.mjs
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
batch_generateno sensitive capabilitycalculate_validationno sensitive capabilitycompare_moleculesno sensitive capabilityexport_anki_deckno sensitive capabilityexport_curated_deckno sensitive capabilitygenerate_3dno sensitive capabilitygenerate_mechanismno sensitive capabilitygenerate_moleculeno sensitive capabilitygenerate_reactionno sensitive capabilitygenerate_species_distributionno sensitive capabilitygenerate_spectrumno sensitive capabilitygenerate_titration_curveno sensitive capabilitylookup_biochemno sensitive capabilitylookup_compoundno sensitive capabilitylookup_molecule_datano sensitive capabilitylookup_pathwayno sensitive capabilitylookup_physicalno sensitive capabilitylookup_safetyno sensitive capabilityopen_chemdraw_fileno sensitive capabilityread_vault_entryno sensitive capabilitysave_pngno sensitive capabilitysearch_vaultno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan chemdraw-mcp --online --registry pypi
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