Chatcut MCP Server
chatcut-mcp-server
PyPI
v0.2.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for local video editing, presentation overlays, transcription, and hardware-accelerated rendering.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (chatcut_mcp/hardware.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`chatcut_mcp/hardware.py:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: res = subprocess.run( ["ffmpeg", "-encoders"], stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server chatcut_mcp/hardware.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (chatcut_mcp/pptx_converter.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`chatcut_mcp/pptx_converter.py:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ] res = subprocess.run(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, check=True)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server chatcut_mcp/pptx_converter.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (chatcut_mcp/server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`chatcut_mcp/server.py:712`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: res = subprocess.run(ffmpeg_cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE) if res.return
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server chatcut_mcp/server.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (chatcut_mcp/transcriber.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`chatcut_mcp/transcriber.py:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ut_audio_path ] subprocess.run(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, check=True) return outpu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server chatcut_mcp/transcriber.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (chatcut_mcp/video_composer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`chatcut_mcp/video_composer.py:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ] res = subprocess.run(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, check=True)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server chatcut_mcp/video_composer.py
Tools 22
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_video_assetingests untrusted inputadd_background_musicno sensitive capabilityadd_dynamic_zoomno sensitive capabilityadd_pip_overlayno sensitive capabilityadd_text_overlayno sensitive capabilityadd_transitionno sensitive capabilityadd_visual_indicatorno sensitive capabilityadd_zoom_effectno sensitive capabilityconvert_pptxno sensitive capabilitydetect_hardwareno sensitive capability
Show 12 more tools ↓
execute_video_pipelineno sensitive capabilityfind_short_clipsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_ai_imageno sensitive capabilitygenerate_ai_speechno sensitive capabilitygenerate_ai_videono sensitive capabilitygenerate_auto_subtitlesno sensitive capabilitygenerate_vertical_crop_timelineno sensitive capabilityparse_video_guidelines_excelno sensitive capabilityrender_video_projectno sensitive capabilitysuggest_viral_cutsno sensitive capabilitytrack_object_with_yolono sensitive capabilitytranscribe_video_fileno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (22 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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