Chaprola MCP Server
@chaprola/mcp-server
npm
v1.19.0
Published by @chaprola — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Chaprola — agent-first data platform. Gives AI agents tools for structured data storage, record CRUD, querying, schema inspection, documentation lookup, web search, URL fetching, scheduled jobs, scoped site keys, and execution via plain HTT
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: chaprola_download → chaprola_list → chaprola_app_deploy_inline. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow chaprola_download → chaprola_list → chaprola_app_deploy_inline
medium Tool "chaprola_delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "chaprola_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool chaprola_delete_file
low Mutating tool "chaprola_delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "chaprola_delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool chaprola_delete_file
Tools 65
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
chaprola_app_deploy_inlinenetwork egresschaprola_delete_filewrites fileschaprola_downloadingests untrusted inputchaprola_fetchingests untrusted inputchaprola_import_downloadingests untrusted inputchaprola_listreads sensitive datachaprola_alterno sensitive capabilitychaprola_app_deployno sensitive capabilitychaprola_app_deploy_processno sensitive capabilitychaprola_app_uploadno sensitive capability
Show 55 more tools ↓
chaprola_app_upload_inlineno sensitive capabilitychaprola_baa_statusno sensitive capabilitychaprola_baa_textno sensitive capabilitychaprola_challengeno sensitive capabilitychaprola_check_usernameno sensitive capabilitychaprola_compileno sensitive capabilitychaprola_configno sensitive capabilitychaprola_consolidateno sensitive capabilitychaprola_create_site_keyno sensitive capabilitychaprola_delete_accountno sensitive capabilitychaprola_delete_projectno sensitive capabilitychaprola_delete_recordno sensitive capabilitychaprola_delete_site_keyno sensitive capabilitychaprola_email_deleteno sensitive capabilitychaprola_email_forwardno sensitive capabilitychaprola_email_inboxno sensitive capabilitychaprola_email_readno sensitive capabilitychaprola_email_sendno sensitive capabilitychaprola_exportno sensitive capabilitychaprola_export_reportno sensitive capabilitychaprola_formatno sensitive capabilitychaprola_hellono sensitive capabilitychaprola_helpno sensitive capabilitychaprola_importno sensitive capabilitychaprola_import_processno sensitive capabilitychaprola_import_urlno sensitive capabilitychaprola_indexno sensitive capabilitychaprola_insert_recordno sensitive capabilitychaprola_intentno sensitive capabilitychaprola_list_site_keysno sensitive capabilitychaprola_loginno sensitive capabilitychaprola_mergeno sensitive capabilitychaprola_optimizeno sensitive capabilitychaprola_optimize_statusno sensitive capabilitychaprola_publishno sensitive capabilitychaprola_queryno sensitive capabilitychaprola_rag_searchno sensitive capabilitychaprola_registerno sensitive capabilitychaprola_relationsno sensitive capabilitychaprola_rename_projectno sensitive capabilitychaprola_reportno sensitive capabilitychaprola_report_paramsno sensitive capabilitychaprola_runno sensitive capabilitychaprola_run_eachno sensitive capabilitychaprola_run_statusno sensitive capabilitychaprola_scheduleno sensitive capabilitychaprola_schedule_deleteno sensitive capabilitychaprola_schedule_listno sensitive capabilitychaprola_searchno sensitive capabilitychaprola_sign_baano sensitive capabilitychaprola_sortno sensitive capabilitychaprola_systemhelpno sensitive capabilitychaprola_unpublishno sensitive capabilitychaprola_update_recordno sensitive capabilitychaprola_upsert_recordno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (65 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.19.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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