Cdp Toolkit MCP Server
cdp-toolkit
npm
v2.2.0
Source verified
Published by sblattj — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
A lightweight chrome-devtools-mcp alternative: a single-target Chrome DevTools Protocol MCP server + CLI that drives one tab over a direct WebSocket with a bounded timeout on every call, so a stuck page can't wedge your agent or force a /mcp restart. 33 t
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/bidi/mux-daemon.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/bidi/mux-daemon.js:2350`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/bidi/mux-daemon.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:2351`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: as spawn3 } from "node:child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:4394`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdir as mkdir8, rm as rm2, stat as stat2, writeFile as writeFile7 } fr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp.js:2351`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: as spawn3 } from "node:child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/bidi/driver.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/bidi/driver.ts:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/bidi/driver.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/bidi/launch.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/bidi/launch.ts:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ildProcess } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "no
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/bidi/launch.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/install/harness.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/install/harness.ts:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdir, readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import { homedir
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/install/harness.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/lighthouse.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/lighthouse.ts:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdir, readFile, stat } from "node:fs/promises"; import { CdpError } fr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/lighthouse.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/screencast.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/screencast.ts:53`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdir, rm, stat, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import { join } f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/screencast.ts
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([wait_for_download, Cookie name. Required and non-empty.]) co-exist with external-action tools ([upload_file]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [wait_for_download, Cookie name. Required and non-empty.] → sinks [upload_file]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow wait_for_download → upload_file
Tools 48
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
Cookie name. Required and non-empty.ingests untrusted inputupload_filenetwork egresswait_for_downloadingests untrusted inputclaim_pageno sensitive capabilityclear_mocksno sensitive capabilityclickno sensitive capabilityclose_pageno sensitive capabilitydelete_cookiesno sensitive capabilitydescribe_toolno sensitive capabilitydispatch_mouseno sensitive capability
Show 38 more tools ↓
dragno sensitive capabilityemulateno sensitive capabilityevaluate_scriptno sensitive capabilityfillno sensitive capabilityfill_formno sensitive capabilityget_console_messageno sensitive capabilityget_network_requestno sensitive capabilitygrant_permissionsno sensitive capabilityhandle_dialogno sensitive capabilityhoverno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_auditno sensitive capabilitylist_console_messagesno sensitive capabilitylist_cookiesno sensitive capabilitylist_leasesno sensitive capabilitylist_mocksno sensitive capabilitylist_network_requestsno sensitive capabilitylist_pagesno sensitive capabilitymock_requestno sensitive capabilitynavigate_pageno sensitive capabilitynew_pageno sensitive capabilityperformance_analyze_insightno sensitive capabilityperformance_start_traceno sensitive capabilityperformance_stop_traceno sensitive capabilityperformance_traceno sensitive capabilityprefers-color-schemeno sensitive capabilitypress_keyno sensitive capabilityrelease_pageno sensitive capabilityresize_pageno sensitive capabilityscrollno sensitive capabilityselect_pageno sensitive capabilityset_cookieno sensitive capabilitystart_screen_recordingno sensitive capabilitystop_screen_recordingno sensitive capabilitytake_heapsnapshotno sensitive capabilitytake_screenshotno sensitive capabilitytake_snapshotno sensitive capabilitytype_textno sensitive capabilitywait_forno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (48 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.2.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
v2.1.0 |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v2.0.0 |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v1.11.0 |
A 94/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v1.10.0 |
A 94/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v1.9.7 |
A 90/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v1.9.5 |
A 90/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v1.7.0 |
A 90/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v1.4.0 |
A 90/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
v1.2.0 |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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