Cc Sensei — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.5.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"target": {
"id": "cc-sensei",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "cc-sensei"
},
"server": {
"name": "cc-sensei"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (claude-code-main/src/memdir/paths.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`claude-code-main/src/memdir/paths.ts:174`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-code-main/src/memdir/paths.ts"
},
"evidence": "~/.ssh",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "claude-code-main/src/memdir/paths.ts",
"line": 174
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (claude-code-main/src/tools/BashTool/bashSecurity.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`claude-code-main/src/tools/BashTool/bashSecurity.ts:1611`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-code-main/src/tools/BashTool/bashSecurity.ts"
},
"evidence": "~/.ssh",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "claude-code-main/src/tools/BashTool/bashSecurity.ts",
"line": 1611
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (claude-code-main/src/bridge/bridgeMain.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`claude-code-main/src/bridge/bridgeMain.ts:1706`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-code-main/src/bridge/bridgeMain.ts"
},
"evidence": "spawn (",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "claude-code-main/src/bridge/bridgeMain.ts",
"line": 1706
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (claude-code-main/src/commands/insights.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`claude-code-main/src/commands/insights.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-code-main/src/commands/insights.ts"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "claude-code-main/src/commands/insights.ts",
"line": 1
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (claude-code-main/src/services/lsp/LSPClient.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`claude-code-main/src/services/lsp/LSPClient.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-code-main/src/services/lsp/LSPClient.ts"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "claude-code-main/src/services/lsp/LSPClient.ts",
"line": 1
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (claude-code-main/src/services/mcp/auth.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`claude-code-main/src/services/mcp/auth.ts:1546`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-code-main/src/services/mcp/auth.ts"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "claude-code-main/src/services/mcp/auth.ts",
"line": 1546
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (claude-code-main/src/tools/BashTool/bashSecurity.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`claude-code-main/src/tools/BashTool/bashSecurity.ts:1348`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-code-main/src/tools/BashTool/bashSecurity.ts"
},
"evidence": "exec (",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "claude-code-main/src/tools/BashTool/bashSecurity.ts",
"line": 1348
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (claude-code-main/src/skills/mcpSkillBuilders.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`claude-code-main/src/skills/mcpSkillBuilders.ts:13`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-code-main/src/skills/mcpSkillBuilders.ts"
},
"evidence": "import(variable)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "claude-code-main/src/skills/mcpSkillBuilders.ts",
"line": 13
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "0cfd112b50e3467de34e9bb6e683f7ee6b804824cbc193f17ff934084cd60f01",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 7,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}