Exteragram MCP Server
@catalystdev/exteragram-mcp
npm
v1.0.0
Published by @catalystdev — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP-сервер для разработки плагинов exteraGram — генерация Python-кода, справочники, деплой через ADB
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([adb_get_logs, generate_read_file]) and tools that can send data out ([adb_shell, generate_send_message, generate_send_message_hook]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [adb_get_logs, generate_read_file] → sinks [adb_shell, generate_send_message, generate_send_message_hook]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow adb_get_logs → adb_shell
high Tool "adb_shell" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "adb_shell" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool adb_shell
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/adb.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/adb.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { z } from "zod"; import { getPluginContext } from "../state/plugin-conte
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/adb.js
medium Tool "generate_write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "generate_write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool generate_write_file
medium Tool "generate_delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "generate_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool generate_delete_file
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "adb_shell"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "adb_shell" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool adb_shell · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "adb_shell" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "adb_shell" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool adb_shell
low Mutating tool "generate_write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "generate_write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool generate_write_file
low Mutating tool "generate_delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "generate_delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool generate_delete_file
low Unconstrained path parameter "path_expr" on "generate_read_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "generate_read_file" takes a path parameter "path_expr" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool generate_read_file · inputSchema.properties.path_expr
low Unconstrained path parameter "path_expr" on "generate_write_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "generate_write_file" takes a path parameter "path_expr" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool generate_write_file · inputSchema.properties.path_expr
low Unconstrained path parameter "ensure_dir" on "generate_write_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "generate_write_file" takes a path parameter "ensure_dir" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool generate_write_file · inputSchema.properties.ensure_dir
low Unconstrained path parameter "path_expr" on "generate_delete_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "generate_delete_file" takes a path parameter "path_expr" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool generate_delete_file · inputSchema.properties.path_expr
Tools 81
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
adb_get_logsreads sensitive dataadb_shellruns code / shellgenerate_delete_filewrites filesgenerate_read_filereads sensitive datagenerate_send_messagenetwork egressgenerate_send_message_hooknetwork egressgenerate_write_filewrites filesadb_check_devicesno sensitive capabilityadb_deploy_pluginno sensitive capabilityadb_list_pluginsno sensitive capability
Show 71 more tools ↓
adb_pull_fileno sensitive capabilityadb_push_fileno sensitive capabilityadb_remove_pluginno sensitive capabilityadb_restart_appno sensitive capabilityclear_plugin_contextno sensitive capabilityexplain_pitfallsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_alert_dialogno sensitive capabilitygenerate_bulletinno sensitive capabilitygenerate_click_listenerno sensitive capabilitygenerate_clipboard_copyno sensitive capabilitygenerate_edit_messageno sensitive capabilitygenerate_ensure_dirno sensitive capabilitygenerate_export_import_settingsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_find_classno sensitive capabilitygenerate_from_javano sensitive capabilitygenerate_get_fieldno sensitive capabilitygenerate_get_settingno sensitive capabilitygenerate_hook_all_constructorsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_hook_all_methodsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_hook_filtersno sensitive capabilitygenerate_hook_param_usageno sensitive capabilitygenerate_hook_resultno sensitive capabilitygenerate_import_blockno sensitive capabilitygenerate_java_helperno sensitive capabilitygenerate_java_subclassno sensitive capabilitygenerate_jclassbuilderno sensitive capabilitygenerate_jfieldno sensitive capabilitygenerate_jmvel_methodno sensitive capabilitygenerate_joverrideno sensitive capabilitygenerate_list_dirno sensitive capabilitygenerate_logno sensitive capabilitygenerate_menu_itemno sensitive capabilitygenerate_metadata_blockno sensitive capabilitygenerate_method_hookno sensitive capabilitygenerate_new_instanceno sensitive capabilitygenerate_notification_listenerno sensitive capabilitygenerate_on_app_eventno sensitive capabilitygenerate_on_plugin_loadno sensitive capabilitygenerate_on_plugin_unloadno sensitive capabilitygenerate_on_update_hookno sensitive capabilitygenerate_on_updates_hookno sensitive capabilitygenerate_parse_textno sensitive capabilitygenerate_plugin_fileno sensitive capabilitygenerate_post_request_hookno sensitive capabilitygenerate_pre_request_hookno sensitive capabilitygenerate_pyobjno sensitive capabilitygenerate_queue_callno sensitive capabilitygenerate_runnableno sensitive capabilitygenerate_send_requestno sensitive capabilitygenerate_set_fieldno sensitive capabilitygenerate_set_settingno sensitive capabilitygenerate_settings_componentno sensitive capabilitygenerate_settings_uino sensitive capabilitygenerate_simple_setting_factoryno sensitive capabilitygenerate_ui_thread_callno sensitive capabilitygenerate_unhookno sensitive capabilityget_plugin_contextno sensitive capabilityget_plugin_templateno sensitive capabilitylist_app_eventsno sensitive capabilitylist_available_librariesno sensitive capabilitylist_common_classesno sensitive capabilitylist_controllersno sensitive capabilitylist_hook_filtersno sensitive capabilitylist_hook_strategiesno sensitive capabilitylist_html_tagsno sensitive capabilitylist_menu_typesno sensitive capabilitylist_queue_constantsno sensitive capabilitylist_settings_componentsno sensitive capabilitylist_standard_dirsno sensitive capabilityset_plugin_contextno sensitive capabilityvalidate_plugin_metadatano sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (81 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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