Notes (cardmagic) MCP Server
@cardmagic/notes
npm
v1.2.0
Source verified
Published by cardmagic — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
CLI and MCP server to search and browse Apple Notes
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 7.5 = 93. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 93 − 6 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/applescript.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/applescript.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; /** * Escapes a string for safe use in AppleScript string literals. * Handles
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/applescript.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/attachments.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/attachments.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, readdirSync } from 'node:fs'; import { homedir } from 'node
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/attachments.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/attachments.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/attachments.js:50`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const result = execSync(`file "${filePath}"`, { encoding: 'utf-8', timeout: 5000 }); if (result
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/attachments.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@cardmagic/notes" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node -e "try{require('child_process').execSync('npm rebuild better-sqlite3',{stdio:'inherit'})}catch(e){}"
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @cardmagic/notes
Tools 9
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_noteno sensitive capabilitydelete_noteno sensitive capabilityedit_noteno sensitive capabilityget_note_statsno sensitive capabilitylist_foldersno sensitive capabilitynotes_in_folderno sensitive capabilityread_noteno sensitive capabilityrecent_notesno sensitive capabilitysearch_notesno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (9 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.0 latest |
B 87/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @cardmagic/notes --onlineOther implementations of Notes 6
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 7 side by side →
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