Canvas Agent MCP Server

canvas-agent npm v2.0.3

Published by hughsibbele — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for Instructure Canvas LMS — connect Claude AI to your courses

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 4

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: download_discussion_entries → list_course_files → send_message. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow download_discussion_entries → list_course_files → send_message

medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool delete_file

low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool delete_file

low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002

In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/setup.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: c, execFileSync } from "child_process"; import { stdin, stdout, platform } from "process"; import { readFileSync, writeF

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/setup.js

Tools 134

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • delete_filewrites files
  • download_discussion_entriesingests untrusted input
  • download_submissionsingests untrusted input
  • generate_quiz_reportingests untrusted input
  • get_fileingests untrusted input
  • get_pageingests untrusted input
  • list_course_filesreads sensitive data
  • list_pagesingests untrusted input
  • send_messagenetwork egress
  • add_module_itemno sensitive capability
Show 124 more tools ↓
  • add_user_to_groupno sensitive capability
  • associate_rubricno sensitive capability
  • auto_distribute_unassignedno sensitive capability
  • batch_update_assignmentsno sensitive capability
  • batch_update_datesno sensitive capability
  • batch_update_discussionsno sensitive capability
  • bulk_gradeno sensitive capability
  • conclude_courseno sensitive capability
  • copy_course_contentno sensitive capability
  • copy_rubricno sensitive capability
  • create_announcementno sensitive capability
  • create_assignmentno sensitive capability
  • create_assignment_overrideno sensitive capability
  • create_calendar_eventno sensitive capability
  • create_courseno sensitive capability
  • create_discussionno sensitive capability
  • create_folderno sensitive capability
  • create_groupno sensitive capability
  • create_group_setno sensitive capability
  • create_moduleno sensitive capability
  • create_new_quizno sensitive capability
  • create_pageno sensitive capability
  • create_quiz_itemno sensitive capability
  • create_rubricno sensitive capability
  • create_sectionno sensitive capability
  • crosslist_sectionno sensitive capability
  • decrosslist_sectionno sensitive capability
  • delete_assignmentno sensitive capability
  • delete_calendar_eventno sensitive capability
  • delete_courseno sensitive capability
  • delete_enrollmentno sensitive capability
  • delete_moduleno sensitive capability
  • delete_module_itemno sensitive capability
  • delete_pageno sensitive capability
  • delete_quiz_itemno sensitive capability
  • delete_rubricno sensitive capability
  • delete_rubric_assessmentno sensitive capability
  • delete_sectionno sensitive capability
  • describe_canvas_mcpsno sensitive capability
  • enroll_userno sensitive capability
  • get_assignmentno sensitive capability
  • get_course_activityno sensitive capability
  • get_course_assignment_analyticsno sensitive capability
  • get_course_schedule_overviewno sensitive capability
  • get_discussionno sensitive capability
  • get_file_quotano sensitive capability
  • get_front_pageno sensitive capability
  • get_grading_standardsno sensitive capability
  • get_late_policyno sensitive capability
  • get_new_quizno sensitive capability
  • get_outcomeno sensitive capability
  • get_outcome_rollupsno sensitive capability
  • get_quizno sensitive capability
  • get_quiz_itemno sensitive capability
  • get_rubricno sensitive capability
  • get_rubric_assessmentsno sensitive capability
  • get_student_activityno sensitive capability
  • get_student_assignment_datano sensitive capability
  • get_student_enrollmentsno sensitive capability
  • get_student_messaging_datano sensitive capability
  • get_student_summariesno sensitive capability
  • get_user_profileno sensitive capability
  • grade_submissionno sensitive capability
  • grade_with_rubricno sensitive capability
  • hide_gradesno sensitive capability
  • list_assignment_groupsno sensitive capability
  • list_assignment_overridesno sensitive capability
  • list_assignmentsno sensitive capability
  • list_calendar_eventsno sensitive capability
  • list_course_tabsno sensitive capability
  • list_coursesno sensitive capability
  • list_discussionsno sensitive capability
  • list_foldersno sensitive capability
  • list_gradeable_studentsno sensitive capability
  • list_grading_periodsno sensitive capability
  • list_group_categoriesno sensitive capability
  • list_groupsno sensitive capability
  • list_missing_submissionsno sensitive capability
  • list_module_itemsno sensitive capability
  • list_modulesno sensitive capability
  • list_new_quizzesno sensitive capability
  • list_outcome_groupsno sensitive capability
  • list_outcome_resultsno sensitive capability
  • list_outcomesno sensitive capability
  • list_page_revisionsno sensitive capability
  • list_quiz_itemsno sensitive capability
  • list_quizzesno sensitive capability
  • list_rubricsno sensitive capability
  • list_sectionsno sensitive capability
  • list_studentsno sensitive capability
  • list_submissionsno sensitive capability
  • list_term_coursesno sensitive capability
  • list_termsno sensitive capability
  • list_users_in_courseno sensitive capability
  • move_student_to_sectionno sensitive capability
  • post_gradesno sensitive capability
  • post_submission_commentno sensitive capability
  • publish_moduleno sensitive capability
  • remove_rubric_from_assignmentno sensitive capability
  • remove_user_from_groupno sensitive capability
  • reset_course_contentno sensitive capability
  • set_late_policyno sensitive capability
  • set_quiz_accommodationsno sensitive capability
  • submission_summaryno sensitive capability
  • update_assignmentno sensitive capability
  • update_assignment_datesno sensitive capability
  • update_assignment_overrideno sensitive capability
  • update_calendar_eventno sensitive capability
  • update_course_navigationno sensitive capability
  • update_course_settingsno sensitive capability
  • update_discussionno sensitive capability
  • update_enrollment_stateno sensitive capability
  • update_fileno sensitive capability
  • update_moduleno sensitive capability
  • update_module_itemno sensitive capability
  • update_new_quizno sensitive capability
  • update_pageno sensitive capability
  • update_quizno sensitive capability
  • update_quiz_datesno sensitive capability
  • update_quiz_itemno sensitive capability
  • update_rubricno sensitive capability
  • update_rubric_assessmentno sensitive capability
  • update_rubric_associationno sensitive capability
  • update_sectionno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 2

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v2.0.3 latest A 93/100 4 1.13.0 2026-09-07
v2.0.2 A 93/100 4 1.12.1 2026-08-10

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan canvas-agent --online

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