Canopy Cli MCP Server
canopy-cli
PyPI
v3.3.0
Published by ashmitb95 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/canopy/actions/bootstrap.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/canopy/actions/bootstrap.py:182`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .monotonic() proc = subprocess.run( install_cmd, shell=True, cwd=worktree_path, capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/canopy/actions/bootstrap.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/canopy/actions/doctor.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/canopy/actions/doctor.py:893`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: out = subprocess.run( ["ps", "-eo", "pid=,ppid=,command="], capture_output=Tru
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/canopy/actions/doctor.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/canopy/agent/runner.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/canopy/agent/runner.py:46`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( command, cwd=cwd, shell=True, ca
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/canopy/agent/runner.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/canopy/cli/main.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/canopy/cli/main.py:1063`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 0]}") try: subprocess.Popen( cmd, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=sub
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/canopy/cli/main.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/canopy/git/hooks.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/canopy/git/hooks.py:158`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: unset.""" result = subprocess.run( ["git", "config", "--get", "core.hooksPath"], cwd=repo_path, cap
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/canopy/git/hooks.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/canopy/git/repo.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/canopy/git/repo.py:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: g. """ result = subprocess.run( ["git"] + args, capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/canopy/git/repo.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/canopy/git/templates/post-checkout.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/canopy/git/templates/post-checkout.py:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: return branch = subprocess.run( ["git", "rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], capture_output=Tru
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/canopy/git/templates/post-checkout.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/canopy/integrations/github.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/canopy/integrations/github.py:71`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: turn False result = subprocess.run( ["gh", "auth", "status"], capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/canopy/integrations/github.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/canopy/integrations/precommit.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/canopy/integrations/precommit.py:45`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: k run` result = subprocess.run( ["git", "rev-parse", "--git-common-dir"], capture_output
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/canopy/integrations/precommit.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/canopy/mcp/server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/canopy/mcp/server.py:85`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: out = subprocess.run( [cli_path, "--version"], capture_output=True, te
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/canopy/mcp/server.py
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([github_get_pr, github_get_branch, github_get_pr_comments, pr_checks, review_comments, issue_get]) co-exist with external-action tools ([triage, review_comments]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [github_get_pr, github_get_branch, github_get_pr_comments, pr_checks, review_comments, issue_get] → sinks [triage, review_comments]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow github_get_pr → triage
Tools 70
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
review_commentsingests untrusted inputnetwork egressgithub_get_branchingests untrusted inputgithub_get_pringests untrusted inputgithub_get_pr_commentsingests untrusted inputissue_getingests untrusted inputpr_checksingests untrusted inputtriagenetwork egressbot_comments_statusno sensitive capabilitybranch_deleteno sensitive capabilitybranch_listno sensitive capability
Show 60 more tools ↓
branch_renameno sensitive capabilitycheckoutno sensitive capabilitycommitno sensitive capabilityconflictsno sensitive capabilitycontextno sensitive capabilitydoctorno sensitive capabilitydraft_repliesno sensitive capabilitydriftno sensitive capabilityfeature_changesno sensitive capabilityfeature_createno sensitive capabilityfeature_diffno sensitive capabilityfeature_doneno sensitive capabilityfeature_link_linearno sensitive capabilityfeature_listno sensitive capabilityfeature_memoryno sensitive capabilityfeature_merge_readinessno sensitive capabilityfeature_pathsno sensitive capabilityfeature_resumeno sensitive capabilityfeature_stateno sensitive capabilityfeature_statusno sensitive capabilityhistorian_compactno sensitive capabilityhistorian_decideno sensitive capabilityhistorian_defer_commentno sensitive capabilityhistorian_pauseno sensitive capabilityissue_list_my_issuesno sensitive capabilityjoinno sensitive capabilitylinear_get_issueno sensitive capabilitylinear_my_issuesno sensitive capabilitylogno sensitive capabilitymigrate_slotsno sensitive capabilitypreflightno sensitive capabilitypushno sensitive capabilityreply_to_threadno sensitive capabilityresolve_threadno sensitive capabilityreview_prepno sensitive capabilityreview_statusno sensitive capabilityrunno sensitive capabilityshipno sensitive capabilityslot_clearno sensitive capabilityslot_loadno sensitive capabilityslot_swapno sensitive capabilityslotsno sensitive capabilitystartno sensitive capabilitystash_dropno sensitive capabilitystash_listno sensitive capabilitystash_list_groupedno sensitive capabilitystash_popno sensitive capabilitystash_pop_featureno sensitive capabilitystash_saveno sensitive capabilitystash_save_featureno sensitive capabilityswitchno sensitive capabilitysyncno sensitive capabilityversionno sensitive capabilityworkspace_configno sensitive capabilityworkspace_contextno sensitive capabilityworkspace_reinitno sensitive capabilityworkspace_statusno sensitive capabilityworktree_bootstrapno sensitive capabilityworktree_createno sensitive capabilityworktree_infono sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (70 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.3.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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