Cisco Axl — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@calltelemetry/cisco-axl-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@calltelemetry/cisco-axl-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@calltelemetry/cisco-axl-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (8 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/chunks/credential-resolver-jh9vlOdK.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/chunks/credential-resolver-jh9vlOdK.js:869`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/chunks/credential-resolver-jh9vlOdK.js"
},
"evidence": "ncate|grant|revoke|call|exec(?:ute)?|procedure|begin|commit|rollback|into|for\\s+update)\\b/i.test(o); if (!o.trim() || s",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/chunks/credential-resolver-jh9vlOdK.js",
"line": 869,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/chunks/credential-source-BY4Rw9-h.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/chunks/credential-source-BY4Rw9-h.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/chunks/credential-source-BY4Rw9-h.js"
},
"evidence": "spawn as s } from \"node:child_process\"; //#region src/lib/credential-source.ts var c = \"AXL_CREDENTIAL_PROVIDER_INVALID\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/chunks/credential-source-BY4Rw9-h.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "axl_execute",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "axl_preview_mutation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "axl_list_objects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "axl_list_operations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "axl_describe_operation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "axl_list_action_operations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "axl_sql_query",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"sql_query\"",
"parameter \"sql\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "axl_sql_update",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"sql\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "42d8a836083676616ea287f28f09c040c41ec5ccbaa2f2bb4be631a34d867cc0",
"stats": {
"tools": 8,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 0,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}