Caid MCP Server
caid-mcp
PyPI
v0.6.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Tool "shell_object" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "shell_object" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool shell_object
high Shell/command execution in server code (caid_mcp/core.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`caid_mcp/core.py:237`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", script], capture_output=True, tex
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server caid_mcp/core.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (caid_mcp/tools/advanced.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`caid_mcp/tools/advanced.py:53`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", wrapper], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server caid_mcp/tools/advanced.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (caid_mcp/tools/parts_user.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`caid_mcp/tools/parts_user.py:154`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", wrapper], capture_output=True, te
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server caid_mcp/tools/parts_user.py
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([freecad_library_browse, freecad_library_import]) co-exist with external-action tools ([shell_object]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [freecad_library_browse, freecad_library_import] → sinks [shell_object]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow freecad_library_browse → shell_object
low Mutating tool "shell_object" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "shell_object" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool shell_object
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_caid_mcp.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_caid_mcp.py:529`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "scene": scene} exec("result = caid.box(5, 5, 5)", exec_globals) assert "result" in exec_globals
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_caid_mcp.py
Tools 107
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
freecad_library_browseingests untrusted inputfreecad_library_importingests untrusted inputshell_objectruns code / shelladd_clearance_holeno sensitive capabilityadd_holeno sensitive capabilityadd_tap_holeno sensitive capabilityalign_objectsno sensitive capabilityassembly_addno sensitive capabilityassembly_mergeno sensitive capabilityassembly_moveno sensitive capability
Show 97 more tools ↓
assembly_rotateno sensitive capabilityboolean_cutno sensitive capabilityboolean_intersectno sensitive capabilityboolean_unionno sensitive capabilitychamfer_solid_edgesno sensitive capabilitychamfer_wire_cornersno sensitive capabilitycheck_object_validno sensitive capabilityclear_sceneno sensitive capabilitycombine_objectsno sensitive capabilitycompare_rendersno sensitive capabilitycreate_arcno sensitive capabilitycreate_array_on_curveno sensitive capabilitycreate_assemblyno sensitive capabilitycreate_belt_wireno sensitive capabilitycreate_boltno sensitive capabilitycreate_boxno sensitive capabilitycreate_circleno sensitive capabilitycreate_circular_patternno sensitive capabilitycreate_coneno sensitive capabilitycreate_cylinderno sensitive capabilitycreate_extruded_polygonno sensitive capabilitycreate_groupno sensitive capabilitycreate_layerno sensitive capabilitycreate_lineno sensitive capabilitycreate_linear_patternno sensitive capabilitycreate_nutno sensitive capabilitycreate_polylineno sensitive capabilitycreate_pulley_assemblyno sensitive capabilitycreate_revolved_profileno sensitive capabilitycreate_sphereno sensitive capabilitycreate_splineno sensitive capabilitycreate_torusno sensitive capabilitycreate_warehouse_bearingno sensitive capabilitycreate_warehouse_fastenerno sensitive capabilitycreate_washerno sensitive capabilitydelete_objectno sensitive capabilitydistribute_objectsno sensitive capabilityduplicate_objectno sensitive capabilityexploded_viewno sensitive capabilityexport_brepno sensitive capabilityexport_stepno sensitive capabilityexport_stlno sensitive capabilityextend_curveno sensitive capabilityextrude_surfaceno sensitive capabilityfillet_solid_edgesno sensitive capabilityfillet_wire_cornersno sensitive capabilityfind_edges_near_pointno sensitive capabilityfind_faces_near_pointno sensitive capabilityfind_partsno sensitive capabilityfreecad_library_searchno sensitive capabilityget_object_propertiesno sensitive capabilityheal_objectno sensitive capabilityimport_brepno sensitive capabilityimport_partno sensitive capabilityimport_stepno sensitive capabilityinspect_objectno sensitive capabilityintersect_curvesno sensitive capabilityjoin_curvesno sensitive capabilitylist_edgesno sensitive capabilitylist_facesno sensitive capabilitylist_fastener_sizesno sensitive capabilitylist_groupsno sensitive capabilitylist_layersno sensitive capabilitylist_objectsno sensitive capabilitylist_snapshotsno sensitive capabilitylist_warehouse_partsno sensitive capabilitylist_warehouse_sizesno sensitive capabilityloft_circle_to_rectno sensitive capabilityloft_profilesno sensitive capabilitymass_propertiesno sensitive capabilitymeasure_distanceno sensitive capabilitymirror_objectno sensitive capabilityoffset_curveno sensitive capabilityorient_objectno sensitive capabilityproject_curveno sensitive capabilityrender_objectno sensitive capabilityrender_sceneno sensitive capabilityrestore_snapshotno sensitive capabilityreverse_curveno sensitive capabilityrotate_objectno sensitive capabilityrun_cadquery_scriptno sensitive capabilitysave_snapshotno sensitive capabilityscale_objectno sensitive capabilityscan_part_libraryno sensitive capabilitysearch_partsno sensitive capabilitysection_viewno sensitive capabilityserver_infono sensitive capabilityset_object_propertiesno sensitive capabilitysimplify_objectno sensitive capabilitysplit_with_objectno sensitive capabilitysplit_with_planeno sensitive capabilitysweep_along_pathno sensitive capabilitysweep_circle_along_pathno sensitive capabilitytranslate_objectno sensitive capabilityundono sensitive capabilityungroupno sensitive capabilityunroll_surfaceno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (107 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.6.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 7 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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