Nitpick — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@buyhatke-dev/nitpick-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@buyhatke-dev/nitpick-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@buyhatke-dev/nitpick-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([export_data]) and tools that can send data out ([evaluate, upload_file]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "export_data → evaluate"
},
"evidence": "sources [export_data] → sinks [evaluate, upload_file]",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"export_data"
],
"sinks": [
"evaluate",
"upload_file"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"evaluate\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"evaluate\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"script\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "evaluate"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/report.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/report.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/report.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; const SEV_COLOR = { high: \"#b91c1c\", medium: \"#c2410c\", low: \"#15803d\" }; const",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/report.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/util/sh.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/util/sh.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/util/sh.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; const MAX_BUFFER = 64 * 1024 * 1024; // 64MB — screenshots/hierarchy dumps are l",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/util/sh.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"script\" on \"evaluate\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"evaluate\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"script\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "evaluate",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.script"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "script"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/doctor.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/doctor.js:28`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/doctor.js"
},
"evidence": "st { chromium } = await import(spec); const p = chromium.executablePath(); return !!p && existsSync(p);",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/doctor.js",
"line": 28,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/drivers/playwright.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/drivers/playwright.js:42`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/drivers/playwright.js"
},
"evidence": "({ chromium } = await import(spec)); } catch { throw new Error(\"Playwright is not installe",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/drivers/playwright.js",
"line": 42,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"evaluate\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"evaluate\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "evaluate"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"filename\" on \"export_data\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"export_data\" takes a path parameter \"filename\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "export_data",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.filename"
},
"data": {
"param": "filename"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"export_data"
],
"externalSink": [
"evaluate",
"upload_file"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"export_data",
"evaluate"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: export_data → evaluate."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "start_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "doctor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "capture",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tap",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "long_press",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scroll",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "input",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "press",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_flow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "observe",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "evaluate",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"script\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "wait",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_findings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "login",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_auth",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_brief",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_map",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_flow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_finding",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "navigate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "open_tab",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tabs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "switch_tab",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "close_tab",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "current_page",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hover",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "focus",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "select_option",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_checked",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drag",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upload_file",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"upload_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "scroll_to",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspect_ui",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_ui",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_ui_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compare_ui_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "audit_ui",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_data",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"export_data\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "486a4d85e6fb95e126d0b06f68594bcf88cf80c1b66f5dc3232cace0975ec53a",
"stats": {
"tools": 39,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 3,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}