Bugherd MCP Server
bugherd-mcp
npm
v0.2.2
Published by berckan — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for BugHerd integration - manage bugs and feedback from AI assistants
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "target_url" on "bugherd_create_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "bugherd_create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "target_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool bugherd_create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.target_url
Tools 37
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
bugherd_create_commentnetwork egressbugherd_create_webhooknetwork egressbugherd_delete_webhooknetwork egressbugherd_add_guestno sensitive capabilitybugherd_add_memberno sensitive capabilitybugherd_create_attachmentno sensitive capabilitybugherd_create_columnno sensitive capabilitybugherd_create_projectno sensitive capabilitybugherd_create_taskno sensitive capabilitybugherd_delete_attachmentno sensitive capability
Show 27 more tools ↓
bugherd_delete_projectno sensitive capabilitybugherd_get_attachmentno sensitive capabilitybugherd_get_columnno sensitive capabilitybugherd_get_organizationno sensitive capabilitybugherd_get_projectno sensitive capabilitybugherd_get_taskno sensitive capabilitybugherd_get_task_by_local_idno sensitive capabilitybugherd_get_task_globalno sensitive capabilitybugherd_get_user_projectsno sensitive capabilitybugherd_get_user_tasksno sensitive capabilitybugherd_list_active_projectsno sensitive capabilitybugherd_list_archived_tasksno sensitive capabilitybugherd_list_attachmentsno sensitive capabilitybugherd_list_columnsno sensitive capabilitybugherd_list_commentsno sensitive capabilitybugherd_list_feedback_tasksno sensitive capabilitybugherd_list_guestsno sensitive capabilitybugherd_list_membersno sensitive capabilitybugherd_list_projectsno sensitive capabilitybugherd_list_taskboard_tasksno sensitive capabilitybugherd_list_tasksno sensitive capabilitybugherd_list_usersno sensitive capabilitybugherd_list_webhooksno sensitive capabilitybugherd_move_tasksno sensitive capabilitybugherd_update_columnno sensitive capabilitybugherd_update_projectno sensitive capabilitybugherd_update_taskno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.2 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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