Bsv (b-open-io) MCP Server
bsv-mcp
npm
v0.3.4
Published by b-open-io — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A collection of Bitcoin SV (BSV) tools for the Model Context Protocol (MCP) framework
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (index.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`index.ts:339`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch( `https://junglebus.gorillapool.io/v1/transaction/get/${txid}`, ); if (!re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server index.ts
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (resources/brcs.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`resources/brcs.ts:93`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; const resp = await fetch( `https://raw.githubusercontent.com/bitcoin-sv/BRCs/master/${path}`, ); if (!re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server resources/brcs.ts
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tools/bsv/decodeTransaction.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/bsv/decodeTransaction.ts:95`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch( `https://junglebus.gorillapool.io/v1/transaction/get/${txid}`, ); if (!response.ok
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/bsv/decodeTransaction.ts
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tools/bsv/getPrice.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/bsv/getPrice.ts:23`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rice const res = await fetch( "https://api.whatsonchain.com/v1/bsv/main/exchangerate", ); if (!res.ok) throw new Er
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/bsv/getPrice.ts
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tools/wallet/fetchPaymentUtxos.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/wallet/fetchPaymentUtxos.ts:36`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch( `https://api.whatsonchain.com/v1/bsv/main/address/${address}/unspent`, ); if (!re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/wallet/fetchPaymentUtxos.ts
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tools/wallet/purchaseListing.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/wallet/purchaseListing.ts:58`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch( `https://ordinals.gorillapool.io/api/txos/${listingOutpoint}?script=true`, )
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/wallet/purchaseListing.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tools/utils/installAgentMaster.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/utils/installAgentMaster.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { z } from "zod"; const installAgentMasterSchema = z.object({ method: z
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/utils/installAgentMaster.ts
Tools 87
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
bmap_readPostsingests untrusted inputbsocial_readPostsingests untrusted inputa2b_discoverno sensitive capabilitybap_friendno sensitive capabilitybap_generateno sensitive capabilitybap_getCurrentAddressno sensitive capabilitybap_getIdno sensitive capabilitybmap_readFollowsno sensitive capabilitybmap_readLikesno sensitive capabilitybsocial_createPostno sensitive capability
Show 77 more tools ↓
bsv_decodeTransactionno sensitive capabilitybsv_exploreno sensitive capabilitybsv_getPriceno sensitive capabilitybsv_toBitcoinno sensitive capabilitybsv_toSatoshino sensitive capabilitybsv_toTokenno sensitive capabilitybsv_toTokenSatoshino sensitive capabilitydroplit_discoverno sensitive capabilitydroplit_fundno sensitive capabilitydroplit_getAccessno sensitive capabilitydroplit_pushno sensitive capabilitymnee_getBalanceno sensitive capabilitymnee_parseTxno sensitive capabilitymnee_sendMneeno sensitive capabilityordinals_getInscriptionno sensitive capabilityordinals_getTokenByIdOrTickerno sensitive capabilityordinals_marketListingsno sensitive capabilityordinals_marketSalesno sensitive capabilityordinals_searchInscriptionsno sensitive capabilityutils_convertDatano sensitive capabilitywallet_a2bPublishMcpno sensitive capabilitywallet_abortActionno sensitive capabilitywallet_acquireCertificateno sensitive capabilitywallet_cancelListingno sensitive capabilitywallet_checkDroplitFaucetStatusno sensitive capabilitywallet_createActionno sensitive capabilitywallet_createDroplitFaucetno sensitive capabilitywallet_createHmacno sensitive capabilitywallet_createOrdinalsno sensitive capabilitywallet_createSignatureno sensitive capabilitywallet_decryptno sensitive capabilitywallet_discoverByAttributesno sensitive capabilitywallet_discoverByIdentityKeyno sensitive capabilitywallet_encryptno sensitive capabilitywallet_gatherCollectionInfono sensitive capabilitywallet_getAddressno sensitive capabilitywallet_getBalanceno sensitive capabilitywallet_getBsv21Balancesno sensitive capabilitywallet_getHeaderForHeightno sensitive capabilitywallet_getHeightno sensitive capabilitywallet_getLockDatano sensitive capabilitywallet_getNetworkno sensitive capabilitywallet_getOrdinalsno sensitive capabilitywallet_getPublicKeyno sensitive capabilitywallet_getVersionno sensitive capabilitywallet_internalizeActionno sensitive capabilitywallet_isAuthenticatedno sensitive capabilitywallet_listActionsno sensitive capabilitywallet_listCertificatesno sensitive capabilitywallet_listOrdinalno sensitive capabilitywallet_listOutputsno sensitive capabilitywallet_listTokensno sensitive capabilitywallet_lockBsvno sensitive capabilitywallet_mintCollectionno sensitive capabilitywallet_opnsDeregisterno sensitive capabilitywallet_opnsRegisterno sensitive capabilitywallet_proveCertificateno sensitive capabilitywallet_purchaseListingno sensitive capabilitywallet_refreshUtxosno sensitive capabilitywallet_registerDroplitKeyno sensitive capabilitywallet_relinquishCertificateno sensitive capabilitywallet_relinquishOutputno sensitive capabilitywallet_revealCounterpartyKeyLinkageno sensitive capabilitywallet_revealDelegationno sensitive capabilitywallet_revealSpecificKeyLinkageno sensitive capabilitywallet_sendAllBsvno sensitive capabilitywallet_sendBsvno sensitive capabilitywallet_signActionno sensitive capabilitywallet_signBsmno sensitive capabilitywallet_sweepBsvno sensitive capabilitywallet_sweepBsv21no sensitive capabilitywallet_sweepOrdinalsno sensitive capabilitywallet_transferOrdTokenno sensitive capabilitywallet_unlockBsvno sensitive capabilitywallet_verifyHmacno sensitive capabilitywallet_verifySignatureno sensitive capabilitywallet_waitForAuthenticationno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (87 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.4 latest |
A 96/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.3.0 |
A 96/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v0.2.15 |
A 96/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan bsv-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Bsv 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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