Browserplex MCP Server
browserplex
npm
v0.5.0
Published by joshuavial — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server + bp CLI for managing multiple named browser sessions with Playwright
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/core/actions.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/actions.js:280`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ied-eval const fn = new Function("electron", args.script); const result = await app.evaluate(fn); return { t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/actions.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/meta.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/meta.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { promises as fs } from "node:fs"; import { DaemonClient, DAEMON_ENTRY }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/meta.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/daemon/client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/daemon/client.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { promises as fs } from "node:fs"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:ur
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/daemon/client.js
Tools 29
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browser_file_uploadnetwork egressbrowser_clickno sensitive capabilitybrowser_console_messagesno sensitive capabilitybrowser_dragno sensitive capabilitybrowser_evaluateno sensitive capabilitybrowser_fill_formno sensitive capabilitybrowser_handle_dialogno sensitive capabilitybrowser_hoverno sensitive capabilitybrowser_navigateno sensitive capabilitybrowser_navigate_backno sensitive capability
Show 19 more tools ↓
browser_network_requestsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_press_keyno sensitive capabilitybrowser_resizeno sensitive capabilitybrowser_select_optionno sensitive capabilitybrowser_snapshotno sensitive capabilitybrowser_tabsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_take_screenshotno sensitive capabilitybrowser_typeno sensitive capabilitybrowser_wait_forno sensitive capabilityelectron_evaluateno sensitive capabilitysession_createno sensitive capabilitysession_destroyno sensitive capabilitysession_listno sensitive capabilitystorage_deleteno sensitive capabilitystorage_listno sensitive capabilitystorage_loadno sensitive capabilitystorage_lockno sensitive capabilitystorage_saveno sensitive capabilitystorage_unlockno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan browserplex --onlineMore in Web, Search & Scraping
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