Browserforce MCP Server
browserforce
npm
v1.2.0
Published by ivalsaraj — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Give AI agents your real Chrome browser with progressive examples: simple reads, form interactions, multi-tab workflows, and state persistence. Search X and GitHub, extract ProductHunt data, test forms, compare A/B variants, monitor status pages. Works wi
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 14
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (mcp/src/browserforce-command-registry.js)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`mcp/src/browserforce-command-registry.js:607`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: {what}`); }, async eval({ body, runtime, timeout }) { const code = String(body?.code ?? ''); if (!code.trim
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp/src/browserforce-command-registry.js
high Tool "exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool exec
high Dynamic code execution in server code (mcp/src/browserforce-command-registry.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`mcp/src/browserforce-command-registry.js:607`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: {what}`); }, async eval({ body, runtime, timeout }) { const code = String(body?.code ?? ''); if (!code.trim
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp/src/browserforce-command-registry.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (mcp/src/exec-engine.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`mcp/src/exec-engine.js:1174`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { userPromise = vm.runInContext(wrapExecuteCode(code), vmContext, { timeout: timeoutMs, displayError
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp/src/exec-engine.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (agent/src/chatd.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`agent/src/chatd.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'; import { promises as fs } from 'node:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server agent/src/chatd.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (agent/src/codex-runner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`agent/src/codex-runner.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import readline from 'node:readline'; function envelope({ event, runId, session
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server agent/src/codex-runner.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin.js:323`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import('node:child_process'); console.log('Checking for updates...'); let update; try { update = aw
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp/src/exec-engine.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp/src/exec-engine.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import vm from 'node:vm'; import { createSmartDiff, parseSearchPattern, } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp/src/exec-engine.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp/src/openclaw-setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp/src/openclaw-setup.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'node:fs/promises'; import path from 'node:path'; const RELAY_PO
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp/src/openclaw-setup.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (bin.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`bin.js:106`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { default: pw } = await import(pwPath); const { chromium } = pw; const cdpUrl = await getCdpUrl(); const baseUrl =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (cli/sessiond.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`cli/sessiond.js:59`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { default: pw } = await import(pwPath); const { chromium } = pw; const cdpUrl = await getCdpUrl(); const baseUrl =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cli/sessiond.js
low Mutating tool "exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool exec
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/postinstall-openclaw.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/postinstall-openclaw.mjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { dirname, resolve } from 'node:path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/postinstall-openclaw.mjs
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"browserforce" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall-openclaw.mjs
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package browserforce
Tools 4
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
execruns code / shellbrowserforceno sensitive capabilityhelpno sensitive capabilityresetno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (4 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 14 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.1.3 |
A 92/100 | 14 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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