Browsercontrol MCP Server
browsercontrol
PyPI
v0.1.4
Published by adityasasidhar — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for browser automation with Set of Marks (SoM) - AI agents can see and interact with web pages using numbered element IDs
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Dynamic code execution in server code (browsercontrol/tools/devtools.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`browsercontrol/tools/devtools.py:172`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const result = eval({code!r}); if (result === undefined) return 'undefined';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server browsercontrol/tools/devtools.py
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_page_content, get_page_info, get_page_errors, get_page_performance]) co-exist with external-action tools ([upload_file]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_page_content, get_page_info, get_page_errors, get_page_performance] → sinks [upload_file]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_page_content → upload_file
Tools 39
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_page_contentingests untrusted inputget_page_errorsingests untrusted inputget_page_infoingests untrusted inputget_page_performanceingests untrusted inputupload_filenetwork egresscheck_checkboxno sensitive capabilityclear_cookiesno sensitive capabilityclickno sensitive capabilityclick_atno sensitive capabilityclose_tabno sensitive capability
Show 29 more tools ↓
create_tabno sensitive capabilitydelete_cookieno sensitive capabilityget_console_logsno sensitive capabilityget_cookiesno sensitive capabilityget_network_requestsno sensitive capabilityget_textno sensitive capabilitygo_backno sensitive capabilitygo_forwardno sensitive capabilityhoverno sensitive capabilityinspect_elementno sensitive capabilitylist_recordingsno sensitive capabilitylist_tabsno sensitive capabilitynavigate_tono sensitive capabilitypress_keyno sensitive capabilityrefresh_pageno sensitive capabilityrun_in_consoleno sensitive capabilityrun_javascriptno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilityscrollno sensitive capabilityscroll_to_elementno sensitive capabilityselect_optionno sensitive capabilityset_cookieno sensitive capabilityset_viewportno sensitive capabilitystart_recordingno sensitive capabilitystop_recordingno sensitive capabilityswitch_tabno sensitive capabilitytake_snapshotno sensitive capabilitytype_textno sensitive capabilitywaitno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.4 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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