Browser Tools (npm) MCP Server
browser-tools-mcp
npm
v1.2.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for browser tools integration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/mcp-server.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp-server.js:76`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`http://${host}:${port}/.identity`, { timeout: 1000, // 1 second timeo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp-server.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (mcp-server.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`mcp-server.ts:91`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`http://${host}:${port}/.identity`, { timeout: 1000, // 1 second timeout
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp-server.ts
Tools 14
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
getConsoleErrorsno sensitive capabilitygetConsoleLogsno sensitive capabilitygetNetworkErrorsno sensitive capabilitygetNetworkLogsno sensitive capabilitygetSelectedElementno sensitive capabilityrunAccessibilityAuditno sensitive capabilityrunAuditModeno sensitive capabilityrunBestPracticesAuditno sensitive capabilityrunDebuggerModeno sensitive capabilityrunNextJSAuditno sensitive capability
Show 4 more tools ↓
runPerformanceAuditno sensitive capabilityrunSEOAuditno sensitive capabilitytakeScreenshotno sensitive capabilitywipeLogsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (14 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.1 latest |
A 95/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan browser-tools-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Browser Tools 4
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 5 side by side →
Monitors and interacts with your local browser: console logs, network traffic, audits and screenshots.
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