Raw scan report

Browser Devtools — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.5.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "browser-devtools-mcp",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "browser-devtools-mcp"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "browser-devtools-mcp"
    }
  },
  "grade": "B",
  "score": {
    "score": 87,
    "grade": "B",
    "band": "B",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 6.3,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 6.3,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
        "category": "injection",
        "severity": "medium",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 9,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 1,
        "appliedPenalty": 6.3
      },
      {
        "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
        "category": "supply-chain",
        "severity": "medium",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 9,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 1,
        "appliedPenalty": 6.3
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "high",
    "reasons": [
      "can send data / act on an external service",
      "can execute shell commands or code"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "code-exec",
      "external-sink"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": false,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
      "title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/core-ELMAUBJZ.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core-ELMAUBJZ.js:4`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/core-ELMAUBJZ.js"
      },
      "evidence": "new Function(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
        "file": "dist/core-ELMAUBJZ.js",
        "line": 4
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/runner.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/runner.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/runner.js"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/cli/runner.js",
        "line": 2
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
      "title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/cli/runner.js)",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/runner.js:158`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/runner.js"
      },
      "evidence": "fetch(`https://registry.npmjs.org/${packageName}/latest`",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
        "file": "dist/cli/runner.js",
        "line": 158
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
      "title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli/runner.js)",
      "category": "injection",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/runner.js:170`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/runner.js"
      },
      "evidence": "execSync(`npm install -g ${",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
        "file": "dist/cli/runner.js",
        "line": 170
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
      "title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
      "category": "supply-chain",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "\"browser-devtools-mcp\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. The large majority of malicious packages abuse install hooks to run code before you ever import them.",
      "remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "package",
        "name": "browser-devtools-mcp"
      },
      "owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
        "https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
      ],
      "data": {
        "scripts": [
          "postinstall"
        ]
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [],
  "capabilities": [],
  "surfaceDigest": "53128b0f6fbbdcf7d1448991ebcbb736b56fb6f84b84b6fc4491b4d92863429f",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 0,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 2,
      "medium": 3,
      "low": 0,
      "info": 0
    }
  }
}