Browser Automation (npm) MCP Server

browser-automation-mcp npm v1.0.1

Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

浏览器自动化MCP服务

View on npm ↗ Raw report (JSON) ↗

Trust grade

94/100

Last scanned 2026-09-07 get badge →

Trust

A · 94/100

Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.

Capability

Moderate

Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.

Coverage

Source

How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.

A Why this grade threat 99 − adoption risk = 94/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:

Points	What was found	Category
−1.2	Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010	supply-chain

2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 5 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

Points	Adoption-risk factor
−3	capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−2	publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010

"browser-automation-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.

Evidence: chmod +x build/server.js

Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.

Location: package browser-automation-mcp

Tools 26

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

browser_get_download_listingests untrusted input
browser_clickno sensitive capability
browser_closeno sensitive capability
browser_close_tabno sensitive capability
browser_evaluateno sensitive capability
browser_form_input_fillno sensitive capability
browser_get_clickable_elementsno sensitive capability
browser_get_console_logsno sensitive capability
browser_get_markdownno sensitive capability
browser_get_textno sensitive capability

Show 16 more tools ↓

browser_go_backno sensitive capability
browser_go_forwardno sensitive capability
browser_hoverno sensitive capability
browser_navigateno sensitive capability
browser_new_tabno sensitive capability
browser_press_keyno sensitive capability
browser_proxyno sensitive capability
browser_read_linksno sensitive capability
browser_run_seo_auditno sensitive capability
browser_screenshotno sensitive capability
browser_scrollno sensitive capability
browser_selectno sensitive capability
browser_switch_tabno sensitive capability
browser_tab_listno sensitive capability
browser_vision_screen_captureno sensitive capability
browser_vision_screen_clickno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Tools were statically extracted from the published source (26 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

Version	Score	Findings	Engine	Scanned
`v1.0.1` latest	A 94/100	1	1.13.0	2026-09-07

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

Markdown (GitHub README)

[![MCP Trust Score](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/browser-automation-mcp/badge.svg)](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/browser-automation-mcp)

HTML

<a href="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/browser-automation-mcp"><img src="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/browser-automation-mcp/badge.svg" alt="MCP Trust Score" height="20"></a>

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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan browser-automation-mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Browser Automation 1

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →

Browser Automation (popoverai) npm

@popoverai/browser-automation

MCP server for AI browser automation. Fork of @browserbasehq/mcp-server-browserbase with LOCAL mode default, Playwright federation, and Vercel header injection.

Browser Automation Score 87/100 2 findings 51/wk Cap. High