Browsepilot — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "browsepilot",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "browsepilot"
},
"server": {
"name": "browsepilot"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (22 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/browser/actions.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/browser/actions.js:172`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/browser/actions.js"
},
"evidence": "{ try { const c = eval(`(${body})`); return typeof c === 'function' ? c(el) : c; } catch (e) { throw new Err",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/browser/actions.js",
"line": 172,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/browser/launcher.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/browser/launcher.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/browser/launcher.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { createRequire } from 'module'; const require = createRequire(import.me",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/browser/launcher.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "browser_snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_navigate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_click",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_type",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_press",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_scroll",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_select",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_hover",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_fill_form",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_evaluate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_extract",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_tab_new",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_tab_switch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_tab_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_tab_close",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_go_back",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_go_forward",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_wait",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_force_click",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_read_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_scroll_container",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "b910eef66ddcc64bab5d662bf01a19650d27f51612afb20e913e998989a9b17a",
"stats": {
"tools": 22,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 0,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}