Brightspace — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "brightspace-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "brightspace-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "brightspace-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 84,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (26 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/cli/commands/ui.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/cli/commands/ui.js:234`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/cli/commands/ui.js"
},
"evidence": "} = await import('node:child_process'); exec(`${process.platform === 'darwin' ? 'open' : process.platform =",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/cli/commands/ui.js",
"line": 234,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/cli/commands/upgrade.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/cli/commands/upgrade.js:62`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/cli/commands/upgrade.js"
},
"evidence": "} = await import('node:child_process'); try { execSync('npm install -g brightspace-mcp@latest', { s",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/cli/commands/upgrade.js",
"line": 62,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/cli/commands/serve.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/cli/commands/serve.js:26`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/cli/commands/serve.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch('https://registry.npmjs.org/brightspace-mcp/latest', { signal }); if (!res.ok)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "build/cli/commands/serve.js",
"line": 26,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/cli/commands/upgrade.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/cli/commands/upgrade.js:34`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/cli/commands/upgrade.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch('https://registry.npmjs.org/brightspace-mcp/latest', { signal }); if (!res.ok)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "build/cli/commands/upgrade.js",
"line": 34,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (build/cli/commands/ui.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/cli/commands/ui.js:235`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/cli/commands/ui.js"
},
"evidence": "_process'); exec(`${process.platform === 'darwin' ? 'open' : process.platform === 'win32' ? 'start' : 'xdg-o",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "build/cli/commands/ui.js",
"line": 235,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "check_auth",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_my_courses",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clear_cache",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_diagnostics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_my_grades",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_assignments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_upcoming_due_dates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_feedback",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_roster",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_classlist_emails",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_syllabus",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_course_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_announcements",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_discussions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_calendar_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_assignment_files",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_topic_file",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_quizzes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_quiz_attempts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_notifications",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_course",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_my_groups",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_audit_log",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "submit_assignment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "post_discussion_reply",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mark_announcement_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "f34933cab0ac46ad71a5beec4939c83ea7de4358bdb6afb4e45715a32201cd5e",
"stats": {
"tools": 26,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}