Brightspace (RohanMuppa) MCP Server
brightspace-mcp-server
npm
v1.6.3
Source verified
Published by rohanmuppa — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Brightspace (D2L). Check grades, due dates, assignments, announcements, syllabus, rosters and more via Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, Windsurf, or any MCP client.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/auth/auth-runner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/auth/auth-runner.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; import * as path from "node:path"; imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/auth/auth-runner.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/auth/browser-auth.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/auth/browser-auth.js:121`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import("node:child_process"); const { promisify } = await import("node:util"); const execFile
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/auth/browser-auth.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/update.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/update.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { dirname, join } from "node:path
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/update.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/setup.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; import { saveConfigStore, getConfigSto
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/setup.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"brightspace-mcp-server" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: npx playwright install chromium
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package brightspace-mcp-server
Tools 13
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_fileingests untrusted inputget_announcementsingests untrusted inputget_assignment_filesingests untrusted inputget_assignmentsingests untrusted inputget_classlist_emailsingests untrusted inputget_course_contentingests untrusted inputget_discussionsingests untrusted inputget_my_coursesingests untrusted inputget_my_gradesingests untrusted inputget_rosteringests untrusted input
Show 3 more tools ↓
get_syllabusingests untrusted inputget_upcoming_due_datesingests untrusted inputcheck_authno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (13 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.6.3 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.6.1 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v1.2.6 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan brightspace-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Brightspace 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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