Bricks MCP Server
bricks-mcp-server
npm
v0.14.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Provider-agnostic MCP server that exposes Bricks Builder pages, templates, global classes and theme styles as tools. Works with any MCP-compatible client (Claude Code, Codex CLI, etc.).
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([bricks_get_page, bricks_update_page]) co-exist with external-action tools ([bricks_manage_integrations]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [bricks_get_page, bricks_update_page] → sinks [bricks_manage_integrations]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow bricks_get_page → bricks_manage_integrations
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/setup.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { createServer } from "node:http"; import { randomUUID } from "node:crypt
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup.js
Tools 29
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
bricks_get_pageingests untrusted inputbricks_manage_integrationsnetwork egressbricks_update_pageingests untrusted inputbricks_apply_element_operationsno sensitive capabilitybricks_apply_global_class_operationsno sensitive capabilitybricks_create_pageno sensitive capabilitybricks_create_templateno sensitive capabilitybricks_delete_mediano sensitive capabilitybricks_delete_pageno sensitive capabilitybricks_find_media_usageno sensitive capability
Show 19 more tools ↓
bricks_get_design_contextno sensitive capabilitybricks_get_elementno sensitive capabilitybricks_get_global_classesno sensitive capabilitybricks_get_preview_urlno sensitive capabilitybricks_get_schemano sensitive capabilitybricks_get_theme_stylesno sensitive capabilitybricks_list_mediano sensitive capabilitybricks_list_pagesno sensitive capabilitybricks_list_templatesno sensitive capabilitybricks_manage_custom_cssno sensitive capabilitybricks_manage_global_datano sensitive capabilitybricks_manage_revisionsno sensitive capabilitybricks_manage_templateno sensitive capabilitybricks_pingno sensitive capabilitybricks_reindex_query_filtersno sensitive capabilitybricks_resolve_dynamic_datano sensitive capabilitybricks_start_hereno sensitive capabilitybricks_update_global_classesno sensitive capabilitybricks_upload_mediano sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.14.0 latest |
A 95/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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