Brandsystem MCP Server
@brandsystem/mcp
npm
v0.16.1
Source verified
Published by brandcode-studio — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Use existing brand guidelines with AI. This MCP server turns websites, PDFs, and Figma libraries into a portable .brand runtime with design tokens, voice rules, provenance, and compliance checks.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/brand-feedback.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/brand-feedback.js:75`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: /require\s*\(\s*['"]child_process/i, /import\s+.*child_process/i, ]; function sanitize(input) { let s = inpu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/brand-feedback.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/cli/install.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/cli/install.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; export const INSTALL_CLIENTS = [ "claude-code", "cline", "codex",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/install.js
Tools 44
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
brand_auditno sensitive capabilitybrand_audit_contentno sensitive capabilitybrand_audit_driftno sensitive capabilitybrand_brandcode_authno sensitive capabilitybrand_brandcode_connectno sensitive capabilitybrand_brandcode_liveno sensitive capabilitybrand_brandcode_statusno sensitive capabilitybrand_brandcode_syncno sensitive capabilitybrand_build_journeyno sensitive capabilitybrand_build_matrixno sensitive capability
Show 34 more tools ↓
brand_build_personasno sensitive capabilitybrand_build_themesno sensitive capabilitybrand_checkno sensitive capabilitybrand_check_complianceno sensitive capabilitybrand_clarifyno sensitive capabilitybrand_compileno sensitive capabilitybrand_compile_messagingno sensitive capabilitybrand_connect_repono sensitive capabilitybrand_contextno sensitive capabilitybrand_deepen_identityno sensitive capabilitybrand_enrich_skillno sensitive capabilitybrand_exportno sensitive capabilitybrand_extract_figmano sensitive capabilitybrand_extract_messagingno sensitive capabilitybrand_extract_pdfno sensitive capabilitybrand_extract_siteno sensitive capabilitybrand_extract_visualno sensitive capabilitybrand_extract_webno sensitive capabilitybrand_feedbackno sensitive capabilitybrand_feedback_reviewno sensitive capabilitybrand_feedback_triageno sensitive capabilitybrand_generate_designmdno sensitive capabilitybrand_ingest_assetsno sensitive capabilitybrand_initno sensitive capabilitybrand_preflightno sensitive capabilitybrand_previewno sensitive capabilitybrand_repo_statusno sensitive capabilitybrand_reportno sensitive capabilitybrand_resolve_conflictsno sensitive capabilitybrand_runtimeno sensitive capabilitybrand_set_logono sensitive capabilitybrand_startno sensitive capabilitybrand_statusno sensitive capabilitybrand_writeno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.16.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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