Socials MCP Server
@brainrotcreations/socials
npm
v2.0.0
Published by @brainrotcreations — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for the Socials browser extension — post, engage, search, and manage social media from Claude Code
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/index.cjs)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.cjs:2943`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.cjs:21546`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: on-bridge.ts var import_child_process = require("child_process"); // node_modules/ws/wrapper.mjs var import_stream = __
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/extension-bridge.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/extension-bridge.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from "child_process"; import { WebSocketServer, WebSocket } from "ws"; import { randomUUID } from "cry
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/extension-bridge.ts
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([socials_quick_reply, socials_get_page_content, socials_fetch_image]) co-exist with external-action tools ([socials_quick_reply, socials_engage_post, socials_x_quote_tweet]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [socials_quick_reply, socials_get_page_content, socials_fetch_image] → sinks [socials_quick_reply, socials_engage_post, socials_x_quote_tweet]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow socials_quick_reply → socials_quick_reply
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "socials_fetch_image"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "socials_fetch_image" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool socials_fetch_image · inputSchema.properties.url
Tools 38
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
socials_quick_replyingests untrusted inputnetwork egresssocials_engage_postnetwork egresssocials_fetch_imageingests untrusted inputsocials_get_page_contentingests untrusted inputsocials_x_quote_tweetnetwork egresssocials_apply_search_filtersno sensitive capabilitysocials_check_accessno sensitive capabilitysocials_create_postno sensitive capabilitysocials_diagnosticsno sensitive capabilitysocials_focus_agent_tabno sensitive capability
Show 28 more tools ↓
socials_generate_replyno sensitive capabilitysocials_get_active_tabno sensitive capabilitysocials_get_agent_tabno sensitive capabilitysocials_get_feedno sensitive capabilitysocials_get_post_contextno sensitive capabilitysocials_health_checkno sensitive capabilitysocials_instagram_create_postno sensitive capabilitysocials_linkedin_connectno sensitive capabilitysocials_linkedin_connection_statusno sensitive capabilitysocials_linkedin_create_postno sensitive capabilitysocials_linkedin_engageno sensitive capabilitysocials_linkedin_get_peopleno sensitive capabilitysocials_linkedin_go_to_pageno sensitive capabilitysocials_linkedin_next_pageno sensitive capabilitysocials_linkedin_people_searchno sensitive capabilitysocials_linkedin_posts_searchno sensitive capabilitysocials_linkedin_profileno sensitive capabilitysocials_list_personasno sensitive capabilitysocials_navigateno sensitive capabilitysocials_open_tabno sensitive capabilitysocials_refresh_authno sensitive capabilitysocials_reload_tabno sensitive capabilitysocials_restart_bridgeno sensitive capabilitysocials_scrollno sensitive capabilitysocials_set_agent_tabno sensitive capabilitysocials_x_notificationsno sensitive capabilitysocials_x_profileno sensitive capabilitysocials_x_searchno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (38 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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