Brainctl — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "brainctl",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "brainctl"
},
"server": {
"name": "brainctl"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (200 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/agentmemory/_impl.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/agentmemory/_impl.py:5226`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/agentmemory/_impl.py"
},
"evidence": "TIER_LABELS = { 0: \"exec (unlimited)\", 1: \"senior-ic (5K)\", 2: \"specialist (2K)\", 3: \"worker (500)\", }",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/agentmemory/_impl.py",
"line": 5226,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/agentmemory/code_ingest.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/agentmemory/code_ingest.py:271`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/agentmemory/code_ingest.py"
},
"evidence": "try: out = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"-C\", str(root), \"ls-files\", \"--cached\", \"--others\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/agentmemory/code_ingest.py",
"line": 271,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/agentmemory/hippocampus.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/agentmemory/hippocampus.py:2418`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/agentmemory/hippocampus.py"
},
"evidence": "n\" / \"brainctl\" subprocess.run( [str(brainctl), \"-a\", event_agent, \"event\", \"add\", alert_summary,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/agentmemory/hippocampus.py",
"line": 2418,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/agentmemory/marketplace_api.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/agentmemory/marketplace_api.py:667`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/agentmemory/marketplace_api.py"
},
"evidence": "try: proc = subprocess.run( [node, str(helper), \"--request\", request_path], capture_",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/agentmemory/marketplace_api.py",
"line": 667,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/agentmemory/mcp_cleanup.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/agentmemory/mcp_cleanup.py:94`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/agentmemory/mcp_cleanup.py"
},
"evidence": "ive). \"\"\" out = subprocess.run( [\"ps\", \"-eo\", \"pid,ppid,etime,user,command\"], capture_output=Tru",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/agentmemory/mcp_cleanup.py",
"line": 94,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/agentmemory/mcp_tools_health.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/agentmemory/mcp_tools_health.py:627`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/agentmemory/mcp_tools_health.py"
},
"evidence": "s _out: subprocess.run( [\"sqlite3\", str(DB_PATH), \".dump\"], stdo",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/agentmemory/mcp_tools_health.py",
"line": 627,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/agentmemory/minting.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/agentmemory/minting.py:407`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/agentmemory/minting.py"
},
"evidence": "try: proc = subprocess.run( [node, str(helper), \"--request\", request_path], capture_",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/agentmemory/minting.py",
"line": 407,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/agentmemory/update.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/agentmemory/update.py:101`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/agentmemory/update.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-m\", \"pip\", \"show\", \"brainctl\"], captu",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/agentmemory/update.py",
"line": 101,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/agentmemory/code_ingest.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/agentmemory/code_ingest.py:188`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/agentmemory/code_ingest.py"
},
"evidence": "try: __import__(mod) except ImportError: missing.append(mod) if missing:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/agentmemory/code_ingest.py",
"line": 188,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cli.py:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_cli.py"
},
"evidence": "n()\" ) result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-c\", patch_code], capture_output=True, text=Tr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_cli.py",
"line": 28,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cmd_update.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cmd_update.py:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_cmd_update.py"
},
"evidence": "nd mocks the underlying subprocess.run (and the small wrapper helpers in agentmemory.update). This is dramatically faste",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_cmd_update.py",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "memory_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "event_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "event_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "entity_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "entity_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "entity_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "entity_observe",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "entity_relate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trigger_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trigger_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trigger_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trigger_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trigger_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "decision_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "handoff_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "handoff_latest",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "handoff_consume",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "handoff_pin",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "handoff_expire",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "agent_orient",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "agent_wrap_up",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pagerank",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resolve_conflict",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "belief_collapse",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "access_log_annotate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "affect_classify",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "affect_log",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "affect_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "affect_monitor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wallet_show",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wallet_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "acc_evaluate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "acc_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "acc_predict",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "acc_resolve",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "agent_register",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "agent_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "agent_ping",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "agent_model",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "task_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "task_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "task_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "context_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "context_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "consolidation_schedule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "allostatic_prime",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "demand_forecast",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "amygdala_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "amygdala_tag",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "amygdala_query_valence",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "amygdala_extinguish",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hot_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cold_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_patterns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "retrieval_effectiveness",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "agent_activity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_utility_rate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aras_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aras_register_trigger",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aras_transition",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aras_drive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aras_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bg_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bg_action_register",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bg_td_emit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bg_shadow_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bg_hold_trigger",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bg_hold_release",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bg_holds_active",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bg_sweep_traces",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bg_weights_show",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bg_modulator_set",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "belief_conflicts_scan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "belief_merge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "belief_propagate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "belief_consensus",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "belief_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "belief_conflicts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "collapse_log",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "collapse_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "belief_set",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "belief_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "belief_seed",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cerebellum_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cerebellum_module_register",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cerebellum_predict",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cerebellum_observe",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "claustrum_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "claustrum_record_binding",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "claustrum_register_modality",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "claustrum_memory_bindings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "claustrum_set",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "colliculi_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "colliculi_orient",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "colliculi_register_pattern",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "colliculi_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "connectome_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "connectome_node_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "connectome_register_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "connectome_register_edge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "connectome_neighbors",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "subsystem_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "subsystem_list_actions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "subsystem_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "subsystem_emit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "subsystem_register",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "subsystem_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "subsystem_configure",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "belief",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tom",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trust",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reflexion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gaps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "federated",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "world",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "workspace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
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