Borgmcp MCP Server
borgmcp
npm
v5.4.1
Source verified
Published by byte-ventures — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Coordinate AI coding agents in shared cubes. Works with Claude Code, Codex, and OpenCode.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 9.5 = 91. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 91 − 6 = 85. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/assimilate-deps.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/assimilate-deps.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnChild } from 'node:child_process'; import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'; import { existsSync, mkdirSync } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/assimilate-deps.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/claude.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/claude.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { realpathSync } from 'node:fs'; import { homedir } from 'node:os'; impor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/claude.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cleanup-cmd.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cleanup-cmd.js:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { realpathSync } from 'node:fs'; import { sep, basename, dirname } from '
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cleanup-cmd.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli-tool-approval.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli-tool-approval.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { chmod, copyFile, mkdir, mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli-tool-approval.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/clone-cmd.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/clone-cmd.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, rmSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/clone-cmd.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/codex-remote.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/codex-remote.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { CodexAppServerClient } from './codex-app-server.js'; import { codexBorg
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/codex-remote.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/config-utils.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/config-utils.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'; import fs from 'fs'; import path from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/config-utils.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/first-run-server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/first-run-server.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'; import { dirname, join } from 'node:path
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/first-run-server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/gc-orphan-inboxes.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/gc-orphan-inboxes.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFileSync, readdirSync, statSync } from 'node:fs'; import { join } f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/gc-orphan-inboxes.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/inbox-monitor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/inbox-monitor.js:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'; import { chmodSync, linkS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/inbox-monitor.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/config-utils.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/config-utils.js:1234`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: : ''; execSync('codex mcp add borg' + apiUrlEnvArg + stateRootEnvArg +
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/config-utils.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/config-utils.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/config-utils.ts:1303`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Root)}` : ''; execSync('codex mcp add borg' + apiUrlEnvArg + stateRootEnvArg + ` --env ${BOR
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/config-utils.ts
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v5.4.1 latest |
B 85/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v5.4.0 |
B 85/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v5.2.0 |
B 85/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v5.1.0 |
B 85/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v4.10.0 |
B 85/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v4.9.0 |
B 85/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v4.8.0 |
B 85/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v4.6.1 |
B 85/100 | 12 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
v4.5.1 |
B 85/100 | 12 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
v4.4.0 |
B 85/100 | 12 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-21 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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