Proton Drive Cli MCP Server
@borealstack/proton-drive-cli-mcp
npm
v0.1.2
Source verified
Published by borealstack — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Manage Proton Drive from Claude, Codex, VS Code/Copilot, and other MCP clients through Proton's official CLI without exposing Proton credentials.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/background.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/background.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { extractUrls } from "./format.js"; const MAX_BUFFER_CHARS = 40_000; expo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/background.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/installer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/installer.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { access, chmod, mkdir, rename, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/installer.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/runner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/runner.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; const MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS = 100_000; export class ChildProcessRunner { run(comm
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/runner.js
Tools 37
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
proton_drive_cli_installingests untrusted inputproton_drive_downloadingests untrusted inputproton_drive_download_asyncingests untrusted inputproton_drive_job_cancelingests untrusted inputproton_drive_job_statusingests untrusted inputproton_drive_read_textingests untrusted inputproton_drive_auth_loginno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_auth_login_cancelno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_auth_login_statusno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_auth_logoutno sensitive capability
Show 27 more tools ↓
proton_drive_auth_statusno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_cli_helpno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_cli_versionno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_copyno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_create_folderno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_deleteno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_diagnoseno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_empty_trashno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_infono sensitive capabilityproton_drive_invitation_acceptno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_invitation_listno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_invitation_rejectno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_listno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_list_asyncno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_moveno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_renameno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_restoreno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_setupno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_sharing_inviteno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_sharing_removeno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_sharing_remove_urlno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_sharing_set_urlno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_sharing_statusno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_trashno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_uploadno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_upload_asyncno sensitive capabilityproton_drive_write_textno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.2 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @borealstack/proton-drive-cli-mcp --onlineMore in Files & Storage
Safe bulk Meta ads: launch 150+ campaigns from Drive folders with spend guardrails and validation.
CLI tool to add MCP servers to various AI coding clients
MCP compatibility adapter for Agent Tool Protocol
MCP server for multi-tenant DuckDB management with R2/S3 storage
A stdio-to-HTTP MCP proxy that transparently intercepts file parameters, reading local files and base64-encoding them before forwarding to the remote server.
Free buyer-side outcome verification and provider comparison for supplied agent receipts.