Bootpay MCP Server

In the server's implementation (`dist/admin/tools/auth.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { startCallbackServer } from '../auth/callback-server.js'; import { start

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/admin/tools/auth.js

In the server's implementation (`dist/admin/tools/commerce-code/index.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { formatErrorForMcp } from '../../errors/index.js'; import { startPayment

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/admin/tools/commerce-code/index.js

In the server's implementation (`dist/admin/tools/generate-code.js:1461`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: ta: any) => { fetch('https://your-server.com/api/confirm', { method: 'POST', headers:

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/admin/tools/generate-code.js

Tool "list_api_scopes" describes a credential store (SSH keys, cloud credentials, a keychain or an equivalent) that nothing in its input schema can address. A tool's interface is the honest statement of what it touches; prose that reaches past it is addressed to the model, not to a reader.

Evidence: KeyChain

Fix: Remove the reference, or expose the target as an explicit, validated parameter so the client can see and consent to what the tool reads.

Location: tool list_api_scopes · description

In the server's implementation (`dist/admin/tools/auth.js:86`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: try { execSync(`open "${loginUrl}"`, { stdio: 'ignore' }); browserOpened = true;

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/admin/tools/auth.js

In the server's implementation (`dist/admin/tools/commerce-code/index.js:223`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: try { execSync(`open "${pageUrl}"`, { stdio: 'ignore' }); browserOpened = true;

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/admin/tools/commerce-code/index.js