bol-mcp
npm
v0.3.0
Published by bartwaardenburg — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for managing orders, offers, shipments, returns, and invoices via the bol.com Retailer API
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/bol-client.js:35`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch("https://login.bol.com/token", { method: "POST", headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/bol-client.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/update-checker.js:14`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://registry.npmjs.org/${packageName}/latest`); if (!response.ok)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/update-checker.js
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_product_listingests untrusted inputget_product_ranksingests untrusted inputget_shipping_labelingests untrusted inputcancel_order_itemno sensitive capabilitycreate_offerno sensitive capabilitycreate_product_contentno sensitive capabilitycreate_replenishmentno sensitive capabilitycreate_returnno sensitive capabilitycreate_shipmentno sensitive capabilitycreate_shipping_labelno sensitive capabilitycreate_subscriptionno sensitive capabilitydelete_offerno sensitive capabilitydelete_subscriptionno sensitive capabilityget_bulk_commissionsno sensitive capabilityget_catalog_productno sensitive capabilityget_chunk_recommendationsno sensitive capabilityget_commissionno sensitive capabilityget_commission_ratesno sensitive capabilityget_competing_offersno sensitive capabilityget_delivery_datesno sensitive capabilityget_delivery_optionsno sensitive capabilityget_inventoryno sensitive capabilityget_invoiceno sensitive capabilityget_invoice_requestsno sensitive capabilityget_invoice_specificationno sensitive capabilityget_load_carrier_labelsno sensitive capabilityget_offerno sensitive capabilityget_offer_exportno sensitive capabilityget_offer_insightsno sensitive capabilityget_orderno sensitive capabilityget_performance_indicatorsno sensitive capabilityget_pick_listno sensitive capabilityget_pickup_time_slotsno sensitive capabilityget_price_star_boundariesno sensitive capabilityget_process_statusno sensitive capabilityget_process_status_bulkno sensitive capabilityget_process_status_by_entityno sensitive capabilityget_product_assetsno sensitive capabilityget_product_categoriesno sensitive capabilityget_product_destinationsno sensitive capabilityget_product_idsno sensitive capabilityget_product_list_filtersno sensitive capabilityget_product_placementno sensitive capabilityget_product_ratingsno sensitive capabilityget_promotionno sensitive capabilityget_promotion_productsno sensitive capabilityget_replenishmentno sensitive capabilityget_retailer_informationno sensitive capabilityget_returnno sensitive capabilityget_sales_forecastno sensitive capabilityget_search_termsno sensitive capabilityget_shipmentno sensitive capabilityget_signature_keysno sensitive capabilityget_subscriptionno sensitive capabilityget_unpublished_offer_reportno sensitive capabilityget_upload_reportno sensitive capabilityhandle_returnno sensitive capabilitylist_invoicesno sensitive capabilitylist_ordersno sensitive capabilitylist_promotionsno sensitive capabilitylist_replenishmentsno sensitive capabilitylist_returnsno sensitive capabilitylist_shipmentsno sensitive capabilitylist_subscriptionsno sensitive capabilityrequest_offer_exportno sensitive capabilityrequest_product_destinationsno sensitive capabilityrequest_product_labelsno sensitive capabilityrequest_unpublished_offer_reportno sensitive capabilitytest_subscriptionno sensitive capabilityupdate_offerno sensitive capabilityupdate_offer_priceno sensitive capabilityupdate_offer_stockno sensitive capabilityupdate_replenishmentno sensitive capabilityupdate_subscriptionno sensitive capabilityupdate_transportno sensitive capabilityupload_shipment_invoiceno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan bol-mcp --online
<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
Signed verification attestations for agent decisions: business, price, freshness, claim checks.
Actual Budget MCP server exposing API functionality
MCP server for Actual Budget - query and manage your personal finances through Claude
The Adyen Model Context Protocol server allows you to integrate with Adyen APIs through LLMs function calling utilizing various Clients. It currently supports the following tools:
Trusted agent-commerce hub: discover, trust-check, and route x402 payments with failover.