Bnbot MCP Server
bnbot-mcp-server
npm
v0.1.3
Published by jackleeio — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP Server for BNBOT Chrome Extension - Control Twitter/X via AI assistants like OpenClaw
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([fetch_wechat_article, fetch_tiktok_video, fetch_xiaohongshu_note, scrape_timeline, scrape_bookmarks, scrape_search_results, scrape_current_view, scrape_thread]) co-exist with external-action tools ([like_tweet, retweet, quote_tweet, follow_user, navigate_to_tweet, scrape_timeline, scrape_thread, post_tweet, submit_reply]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [fetch_wechat_article, fetch_tiktok_video, fetch_xiaohongshu_note, scrape_timeline, scrape_bookmarks, scrape_search_results, scrape_current_view, scra
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow fetch_wechat_article → like_tweet
Tools 31
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
scrape_threadingests untrusted inputnetwork egressscrape_timelineingests untrusted inputnetwork egressfetch_tiktok_videoingests untrusted inputfetch_wechat_articleingests untrusted inputfetch_xiaohongshu_noteingests untrusted inputfollow_usernetwork egresslike_tweetnetwork egressnavigate_to_tweetnetwork egresspost_tweetnetwork egressquote_tweetnetwork egress
Show 21 more tools ↓
retweetnetwork egressscrape_bookmarksingests untrusted inputscrape_current_viewingests untrusted inputscrape_search_resultsingests untrusted inputsubmit_replynetwork egressaccount_analyticsno sensitive capabilitycreate_articleno sensitive capabilityfill_article_bodyno sensitive capabilityfill_article_titleno sensitive capabilityget_current_page_infono sensitive capabilityget_extension_statusno sensitive capabilitynavigate_to_bookmarksno sensitive capabilitynavigate_to_followingno sensitive capabilitynavigate_to_notificationsno sensitive capabilitynavigate_to_searchno sensitive capabilityopen_article_editorno sensitive capabilitypost_threadno sensitive capabilitypublish_articleno sensitive capabilityreturn_to_timelineno sensitive capabilitysearch_jobsno sensitive capabilityupload_article_header_imageno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.3 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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