Drush MCP Server
@bloomidea/drush-mcp
npm
v0.4.0
Published by @bloomidea — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Drupal via Drush
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([drupal_sql_query]) and tools that can send data out ([drupal_php_eval]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [drupal_sql_query] → sinks [drupal_php_eval]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow drupal_sql_query → drupal_php_eval
high Tool "drupal_php_eval" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "drupal_php_eval" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool drupal_php_eval
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/transport/base.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/transport/base.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execFile, spawn } from 'child_process'; export class BaseTransport { config; constructor(config) { this.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/transport/base.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/transport/docker.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/transport/docker.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execFile, spawn } from 'child_process'; import { shellQuote } from './shell.js'; import { BaseTransport } from './base.j
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/transport/docker.js
low Mutating tool "drupal_php_eval" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "drupal_php_eval" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool drupal_php_eval
Tools 19
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
drupal_php_evalruns code / shelldrupal_sql_queryreads sensitive datadrupal_cache_rebuildno sensitive capabilitydrupal_config_getno sensitive capabilitydrupal_config_setno sensitive capabilitydrupal_drushno sensitive capabilitydrupal_entity_createno sensitive capabilitydrupal_entity_deleteno sensitive capabilitydrupal_entity_listno sensitive capabilitydrupal_entity_readno sensitive capability
Show 9 more tools ↓
drupal_entity_updateno sensitive capabilitydrupal_field_infono sensitive capabilitydrupal_file_attachno sensitive capabilitydrupal_file_uploadno sensitive capabilitydrupal_introspectno sensitive capabilitydrupal_statusno sensitive capabilitydrupal_user_blockno sensitive capabilitydrupal_user_createno sensitive capabilitydrupal_watchdogno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.3.1 |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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