Blatant Why MCP Server
blatant-why
npm
v0.1.0-beta
Published by 001tmf — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 11 = 83. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: cloud_get_results → tamarind_list_files → tamarind_upload_file. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow cloud_get_results → tamarind_list_files → tamarind_upload_file
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/init.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/init.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync } from "node:fs"; im
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/init.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/templates.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/templates.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; /** * Resolve the templates/ director
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/templates.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/verify.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/verify.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; export function verifyMcpServers() { const failed = []; let passed = 0;
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/verify.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (templates/.claude/mcp_servers/local_compute/server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`templates/.claude/mcp_servers/local_compute/server.py:74`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["nvidia-smi", "--query-gpu=name", "--format=csv,noheader"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server templates/.claude/mcp_servers/local_compute/server.py
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/templates.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/templates.js:170`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { execSync(`claude mcp add -s project ${envFlags} "${serverName}" -- uv run --script "${scriptPath
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/templates.js
Tools 83
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
cloud_get_resultsingests untrusted inputpdb_downloadingests untrusted inputpdb_fetch_structureingests untrusted inputtamarind_list_filesreads sensitive datatamarind_upload_filenetwork egressuniprot_fetch_proteiningests untrusted inputadaptyv_confirm_submissionno sensitive capabilityadaptyv_estimate_costno sensitive capabilityadaptyv_get_experiment_statusno sensitive capabilityadaptyv_get_resultsno sensitive capability
Show 73 more tools ↓
adaptyv_prepare_submissionno sensitive capabilitycampaign_add_roundno sensitive capabilitycampaign_createno sensitive capabilitycampaign_export_csvno sensitive capabilitycampaign_export_fastano sensitive capabilitycampaign_generate_visualizationno sensitive capabilitycampaign_getno sensitive capabilitycampaign_get_cost_estimateno sensitive capabilitycampaign_get_decisionsno sensitive capabilitycampaign_get_summaryno sensitive capabilitycampaign_log_decisionno sensitive capabilitycampaign_record_scoresno sensitive capabilitycampaign_suggest_next_roundno sensitive capabilitycampaign_update_roundno sensitive capabilitycampaign_update_statusno sensitive capabilitycloud_estimate_costno sensitive capabilitycloud_get_batch_statusno sensitive capabilitycloud_get_statusno sensitive capabilitycloud_list_providersno sensitive capabilitycloud_submit_batchno sensitive capabilitycloud_submit_jobno sensitive capabilitycloud_wait_batchno sensitive capabilityinterpret_scoresno sensitive capabilityknowledge_consolidateno sensitive capabilityknowledge_get_recommendationsno sensitive capabilityknowledge_query_similarno sensitive capabilityknowledge_scaffold_rankingsno sensitive capabilityknowledge_store_campaignno sensitive capabilityknowledge_store_failureno sensitive capabilitylocal_detect_gpuno sensitive capabilitylocal_detect_toolsno sensitive capabilitylocal_run_boltzgenno sensitive capabilitylocal_run_protenixno sensitive capabilitylocal_run_pxdesignno sensitive capabilitypdb_get_chainsno sensitive capabilitypdb_interface_residuesno sensitive capabilitypdb_searchno sensitive capabilityresearch_analyze_known_bindersno sensitive capabilityresearch_check_noveltyno sensitive capabilityresearch_find_similar_targetsno sensitive capabilityresearch_get_target_infono sensitive capabilityresearch_search_prior_artno sensitive capabilitysabdab_cdr_sequencesno sensitive capabilitysabdab_get_structureno sensitive capabilitysabdab_search_antibodiesno sensitive capabilitysabdab_search_by_antigenno sensitive capabilityscore_ipsaeno sensitive capabilityscore_ipsae_multi_seedno sensitive capabilityscreen_align_sequencesno sensitive capabilityscreen_compositeno sensitive capabilityscreen_cross_validateno sensitive capabilityscreen_developabilityno sensitive capabilityscreen_diagnose_failuresno sensitive capabilityscreen_diversityno sensitive capabilityscreen_liabilitiesno sensitive capabilityscreen_naturalnessno sensitive capabilityscreen_net_chargeno sensitive capabilityscreen_pareto_frontno sensitive capabilityscreen_shape_complementarityno sensitive capabilityssh_detect_gpu_remoteno sensitive capabilityssh_detect_tools_remoteno sensitive capabilityssh_run_jobno sensitive capabilitytamarind_get_jobno sensitive capabilitytamarind_list_jobsno sensitive capabilitytamarind_list_toolsno sensitive capabilitytamarind_screen_developabilityno sensitive capabilitytamarind_screen_naturalnessno sensitive capabilitytamarind_submit_batchno sensitive capabilitytamarind_submit_jobno sensitive capabilitytamarind_wait_for_jobno sensitive capabilityuniprot_get_domainsno sensitive capabilityuniprot_get_variantsno sensitive capabilityuniprot_searchno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (83 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0-beta latest |
B 83/100 | 6 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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