Blast Scope — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.5.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"target": {
"id": "blast-scope",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "blast-scope"
},
"server": {
"name": "blast-scope"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 98,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 2.1,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 2.1
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/blast_scope/classes/find.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/blast_scope/classes/find.py:83`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/blast_scope/classes/find.py"
},
"evidence": "id_rsa",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "src/blast_scope/classes/find.py",
"line": 83
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/blast_scope/recoverability.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/blast_scope/recoverability.py:11`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/blast_scope/recoverability.py"
},
"evidence": "id_rsa",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "src/blast_scope/recoverability.py",
"line": 11
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/blast_scope/resolution.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/blast_scope/resolution.py:617`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/blast_scope/resolution.py"
},
"evidence": ".aws/credentials",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "src/blast_scope/resolution.py",
"line": 617
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/blast_scope/risk_scorer.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/blast_scope/risk_scorer.py:232`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/blast_scope/risk_scorer.py"
},
"evidence": "id_rsa",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "src/blast_scope/risk_scorer.py",
"line": 232
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/blast_scope/snapshot.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/blast_scope/snapshot.py:254`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/blast_scope/snapshot.py"
},
"evidence": "~/.ssh",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "src/blast_scope/snapshot.py",
"line": 254
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (tests/test_security_regressions.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`tests/test_security_regressions.py:35`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_security_regressions.py"
},
"evidence": "id_rsa",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "tests/test_security_regressions.py",
"line": 35
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bench/saber_eval.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bench/saber_eval.py:166`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bench/saber_eval.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bench/saber_eval.py",
"line": 166
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/blast_scope/classes/docker.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/blast_scope/classes/docker.py:128`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/blast_scope/classes/docker.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/blast_scope/classes/docker.py",
"line": 128
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/blast_scope/classes/find.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/blast_scope/classes/find.py:218`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/blast_scope/classes/find.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/blast_scope/classes/find.py",
"line": 218
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/blast_scope/classes/git.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/blast_scope/classes/git.py:116`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/blast_scope/classes/git.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/blast_scope/classes/git.py",
"line": 116
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/blast_scope/classes/rsync.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/blast_scope/classes/rsync.py:128`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/blast_scope/classes/rsync.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/blast_scope/classes/rsync.py",
"line": 128
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/blast_scope/command_parser.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/blast_scope/command_parser.py:669`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/blast_scope/command_parser.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/blast_scope/command_parser.py",
"line": 669
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/blast_scope/eval.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/blast_scope/eval.py:128`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/blast_scope/eval.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/blast_scope/eval.py",
"line": 128
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/blast_scope/recoverability.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/blast_scope/recoverability.py:86`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/blast_scope/recoverability.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/blast_scope/recoverability.py",
"line": 86
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/blast_scope/resolution.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/blast_scope/resolution.py:733`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/blast_scope/resolution.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/blast_scope/resolution.py",
"line": 733
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/blast_scope/speculate.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/blast_scope/speculate.py:247`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/blast_scope/speculate.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/blast_scope/speculate.py",
"line": 247
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package has no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"blast-scope\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "blast-scope"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"blast-scope\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "blast-scope"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "17e2493326447b3743e9600c186b266b3b2981dbc14ee1fb9ed7896cb4e148f3",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 16,
"medium": 0,
"low": 1,
"info": 1
}
}
}