Blackhole — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.5.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"target": {
"id": "@blackhole-dex/blackhole-mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@blackhole-dex/blackhole-mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "@blackhole-dex/blackhole-mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 98,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 2.1,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 2.1
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/skills/allowances.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/skills/allowances.js:55`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/skills/allowances.js"
},
"evidence": "fetch(\"https://resources.blackhole.xyz/token-details.json\"",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/skills/allowances.js",
"line": 55
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/skills/almVaults.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/skills/almVaults.js:73`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/skills/almVaults.js"
},
"evidence": "fetch(\"https://resources.blackhole.xyz/token-details.json\"",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/skills/almVaults.js",
"line": 73
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/skills/poolLpProviders.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/skills/poolLpProviders.js:44`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/skills/poolLpProviders.js"
},
"evidence": "fetch(\"https://resources.blackhole.xyz/token-details.json\"",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/skills/poolLpProviders.js",
"line": 44
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/skills/poolStatus.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/skills/poolStatus.js:128`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/skills/poolStatus.js"
},
"evidence": "fetch(\"https://resources.blackhole.xyz/token-details.json\"",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/skills/poolStatus.js",
"line": 128
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/skills/portfolio.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/skills/portfolio.js:81`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/skills/portfolio.js"
},
"evidence": "fetch(\"https://resources.blackhole.xyz/token-details.json\"",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/skills/portfolio.js",
"line": 81
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/skills/tokenomics.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/skills/tokenomics.js:60`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/skills/tokenomics.js"
},
"evidence": "fetch(\"https://resources.blackhole.xyz/token-details.json\"",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/skills/tokenomics.js",
"line": 60
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/skills/voteLeaderboard.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/skills/voteLeaderboard.js:33`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/skills/voteLeaderboard.js"
},
"evidence": "fetch(\"https://resources.blackhole.xyz/token-details.json\"",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/skills/voteLeaderboard.js",
"line": 33
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/utils/tokenPrices.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/tokenPrices.js:10`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/tokenPrices.js"
},
"evidence": "fetch(\"https://resources.blackhole.xyz/token-details.json\"",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/utils/tokenPrices.js",
"line": 10
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/skills/allowances.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/skills/allowances.ts:69`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/skills/allowances.ts"
},
"evidence": "fetch(\"https://resources.blackhole.xyz/token-details.json\"",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/skills/allowances.ts",
"line": 69
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/skills/almVaults.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/skills/almVaults.ts:96`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/skills/almVaults.ts"
},
"evidence": "fetch(\"https://resources.blackhole.xyz/token-details.json\"",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/skills/almVaults.ts",
"line": 96
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package has no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"@blackhole-dex/blackhole-mcp-server\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@blackhole-dex/blackhole-mcp-server"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "363d741143d0e01bc6b995196e497011e48fcc9ebd0e60ac37591a3880bf6a4a",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 10,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}